

REPORT

DESIGNING THE 21ST CENTURY ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: **How Electricity Buyers can Accelerate Change**



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ABOUT THE REBA INSTITUTE

The REBA Institute, an affiliate of the Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance, serves as a center of excellence for transformational clean energy research, thought leadership and educational resources that identify barriers, best practices and solutions to today's clean energy challenges.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Alternating Current
BA	Balancing Authority
BCA	Benefit Cost Analysis
BPA	Bonneville Power Administration
BTM	Behind-the-Meter
CAISO	California Independent System Operator
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
CEC	California Energy Commission
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CPUC	California Public Utilities Commission
DC	Direct Current
DER	Distributed Energy Resources
DOE	Department of Energy
EIPC	Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative
ELCC	Effective Load Carrying Capacity
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
EPSA	Electric Power Supply Association
ERCOT	Electric Reliability Council of Texas
ESIG	Energy Systems Integration Group

EUE	Expected Unserved Energy
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FFR	Fast Frequency Response
GET	Grid-Enhancing Technologies
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
GW	Gigawatt
GWH	Gigawatt-hours
HVDC	High Voltage Direct Current
IEA	International Energy Agency
IPP	Independent Power Producer
IRM	Installed Reserve Margin
IRP	Integrated Resource Planning
ISO	Independent System Operator
ISO-NE	ISO New England
KV	Kilovolts
LBNL	Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
LCOE	Levelized Cost of Energy
LED	Light-Emitting Diode
LOLE	Loss of Load Expectation
LOLP	Loss of Load Probability
LSE	Load Serving Entity

MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MOPR	Minimum Offer Price Rule
MVA	Megavolt Amperes
MW	Megawatt
MWH	Megawatt-hours
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NESCOE	New England States Committee on Electricity
NREL	National Renewable Energy Laboratory
NYISO	New York Independent System Operator
ORDC	Operating Reserve Demand Curve
PBR	Performance-Based Regulation
PJM	PJM Interconnection
PMA	Power Marketing Administration
POLR	Provider of Last Resort
PPA	Power Purchase Agreement
PFR	Primary Frequency Response
PRM	Planning Reserve Margin
PSC	Public Service Commission

PUC	Public Utility Commission
PURPA	Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act
PV	Photovoltaic
R&D	Research & Development
RA	Resource Adequacy
REALM	Renewable Energy and Load Management
REBA	Renewable Energy Buyer's Alliance
REC	Renewable Energy Credit
RPS	Renewable Portfolio Standard
RTO	Regional Transmission Organization
SCED	Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch
SO	System Operator
SPP	Southwest Power Pool
TREC	Time-stamped Renewable Energy Credit
TW	Terawatt
TWH	Terawatt-hours
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VER	Variable Energy Resource
VOLL	Value of Lost Load

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Power system operation and planning approaches were designed for the resource mix of the 20th century. The utility and regulatory structure we inherited was designed for baseload, intermediate, and peak load-serving conventional power plants. The resource mix of the 21st century looks very different from the past. Its characteristics in both the short-term day-to-day operations time frame and the long-term investment and planning time frame will require different methods and institutions.

Decarbonizing 90 percent of the power system can be accomplished reliably and affordably with today's technologies if best practice operating and planning institutions and methods are put in place. How to decarbonize the last 10 percent of the power system at a low cost is less clear at the present time. Innovation and research and development (R&D) will be important to develop "clean firm" sources.

Given cost trends, it is almost certain that a majority of electricity production will be from wind and solar energy. Wind and solar plants have variable output, can only be dispatched when their resource is available, and tend to be located remotely from population centers requiring new approaches to grid planning and management.

The question for short-term operations is how to run a reliable power system with a majority of the energy coming from variable renewable energy. Wind and solar plants tend to produce at different times and places than system load. Studies and experiences from around the world show that power systems can be operated with high-penetrations of renewable energy by moving energy to where and when it is needed. Power can be moved across time with battery energy storage and controllable demand, and potentially with longer duration



storage in the future. Power can be moved across space with transmission infrastructure and large regional power markets. There is always renewable output somewhere and at some time of day in a large, interconnected grid. Studies and experiences show a significant role for storage, demand response, and transmission to move power to where and when it is needed. Each of these resources play a unique and complementary role in this 21st century electricity portfolio. Placing these changes into short-term operations will require changes to system operations policies and institutions.

A key question for the long-term planning and investment time frame in a system relying predominantly on wind and solar energy that has zero marginal costs is how investors can invest in markets with low power prices and still recoup enough revenue to justify the investments. This challenge exists

both for carbon-free sources and the other sources needed to balance the system when renewable output is low. This conundrum can be solved with more and better long-term contracting for the various electricity products, including flexibility, energy at all times, and environmental attributes. Improving long-term contracting will require changes to planning and investment institutions and policies. States will need to assign clear responsibility for resource procurement and forward contracting. Some states may wish to ensure that retail customers, especially small customers, are planned for by some regulated entity so that they are not exposed to too much price or reliability risk. Other states may wish to provide choice options to some or all customer classes, enabling them to procure the type of power they choose. Those states will need to balance consumer choice with consumer protections and ensure fair allocation of costs between customer classes.

The 21st century electricity system will require certain changes to achieve climate targets and to benefit all users:



Large regional transmission organizations (RTOs) with best practice market design, including fast dispatch and locational and value-based pricing along with hedging and a circuit-breaker mechanism to protect consumers.



Well-functioning energy procurement structures, on a voluntary or mandatory basis, to facilitate long-term contracting, resource adequacy, and lower financing costs for the large amount of new generation needed.



Transmission planning and cost allocation to expand regional and interregional capacity based on appropriate recognition of the future electricity portfolio and the resilience value of transmission.



R&D in two principal areas to bring the costs down and improve the performance of (1) clean long-duration storage sources and (2) high voltage direct current (HVDC) converter stations.



Resource adequacy assessments and stress testing of the integrated power, gas, water, and other infrastructure systems.



Reliability and generation performance standards to ensure reliability and resilience.

RELIABILITY, MARKETS, AND CLEAN ENERGY

Threats to reliability from polar vortices, summer heat waves, and other events over the last decade highlight the important role electricity plays in ensuring public health and safety, and the interconnectedness of our water, fuel, electricity, and other infrastructure systems. Ensuring that power systems of the future meet high levels of reliability, resilience, affordability, and clean energy requires continuous long-term, whole-system planning. While market forces can benefit customers in certain sectors of the electric industry, the whole industry remains “affected with the public interest” in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, and will continue to require public policy and regulations of various types to meet the ongoing needs of all electricity customers.

Reliability and resilience can be ensured for all electricity customers through full-system assessments of how each region can meet load in all reasonably foreseeable situations. Regulators can perform stress tests to evaluate threats that may be present in a given region, and what a reliable, resilient, and low emission portfolio may be for that region.

In order to ensure a sustainable power system that meets all objectives of innovation and public policy there needs to be a balance of market forces and regulation. Market forces are not sufficient, in the case of the electricity sector, to drive efficient outcomes and enable choice and innovation. In addition, public policies will be needed to continue to ensure reliability and that other public policy objectives are met.

Those sectors that remain natural monopolies or public goods as defined in economics, such as transmission, distribution, and system operation, will generally require a single entity that is fully regulated to perform the function. Structurally competitive sectors, such as generation, may benefit from allowing many participants rather than one entity with a legally enforced franchise monopoly. Expanding competition in generation and accelerating clean energy development will need to be paired with careful reviews, expansion of reliability regulations, and system planning as recent reliability incidents have reminded us.

ELECTRICITY CUSTOMER FOCUS

As changes are made to electric industry operations and planning methods and institutions, certain aspects of these changes will have particular impacts on large electricity customers. Relative to most other stakeholder sectors, large customers are uniquely concerned with reliability, cost, and emissions. Many customers are approaching 100 percent carbon-free purchasing of the megawatt-hours (MWhs) of energy they consume. It is not always feasible nor efficient for each customer to match their individual load and clean energy purchasing by time and location. The full power system must work together to enable all electricity customers to receive clean, reliable, and low-cost energy.

Large electricity customers can and should be involved in electricity policy along with the other stakeholder groups at the table in state, regional, and federal policy forums. Customers have the ability to drive demand for zero-carbon electricity sources

through their procurement and goals, and can advocate for the market structure and design changes that enable a low-carbon, reliable, and cost-effective power system. They can focus on the features of particular importance to their sector as associated policies develop. Customers may also pursue direct investments in complementary sectors beyond renewable energy procurement.

Of the changes necessary to decarbonize the power system in a reliable and efficient way, the following features are of particular benefit to large electricity customers:

- New RTOs in regions where they do not yet exist. RTO governance reform so that the overall voting reflects equal weight from electricity customers and sellers. Market design that accommodates state policy and customer bilateral contracting rather than counteracting them.
- Hedging and price circuit-breaker mechanisms to protect consumers while enabling accurate price signals on the margin for flexible resources.
- Market design that includes non-discriminatory operations reliability services definitions that allow clean energy and customer-owned resources the opportunity to provide these services on a level playing field.
- Independent, market monitoring and mitigation to keep wholesale power prices competitive and protect all electricity customers.
- Market design that is open to and better integrates distributed and energy-limited resources.
- Transmission planning and oversight by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that achieves appropriate grid expansion while ensuring the benefits exceed costs, grid-enhancing technologies are appropriately deployed, and the replacement of old assets is done in a way that captures longer term and regional efficiencies.
- Utility and state reliance on full competition in the generation sector rather than providing any advantages to utility-owned generation in both the operations or planning time frame.
- New approaches to resource adequacy that appropriately allocate risks between electricity customers and sellers, and better reflect customer preferences.

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to identify the most important changes needed for the U.S. electric power system to achieve aggressive emissions reductions targets reliably and efficiently, and to identify which changes most significantly impact large electricity customers. The report is intended to be used by policymakers and key energy markets stakeholders as a roadmap for reforming the power sector, and by large electricity customers specifically to focus their attention and resources on relevant areas of market design.

Electricity customers have materially changed the US electricity resource mix in recent years as companies have met corporate climate goals by purchasing renewable energy. Since 2013, [corporations have contracted](#) nearly 35 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy projects through power purchase agreements (PPA), green power purchases, green tariffs, or privately-owned projects.¹ Taking their goals one step further, recent announcements by electricity customers are indicate not only a focus on renewable energy procurement, but also on net-zero emissions goals to further reduce their carbon footprint.

Customer interests have been increasingly influential in working with utilities and other market participants to drive state and federal electricity policy changes that accelerate clean energy deployment. It is natural for the interests of electricity customers to shape an industry through demand signals, yet in



a heavily regulated industry like electricity, change has to occur in regulatory policies as well. Customers are well-positioned to influence policy because they create jobs and drive economic development that is beneficial for all states. Many electricity customers themselves, even those who previously paid little attention to electricity, have built teams of energy procurement specialists and work with utilities, grid operators, regulators, and other policymakers around the country to navigate the electric industry and its regulatory labyrinth. The customer voice in policy proceedings carries extra weight since state and federal economic regulatory policies are based on consumer protection statutes.

¹ REBA Institute, "REBA Deal Tracker."

The large electricity customer perspective is unique in the regulatory area because they care as much as any stakeholder about reliable service and cost, and about the environmental attributes of energy procurement. At the end of the day customers must run their offices, data centers, stores, warehouses, and factories with reliable energy and remain cost-competitive in global markets. This combination of priorities adds a unique dimension to past electricity stakeholders and interest groups.

Electricity customers have an interest in the whole electricity portfolio. Customers have focused in recent years on their own service and have made great strides in changing their own procurement approach in recent years.² However, separating individual purchases from the rest of the electricity system is not possible since customers and the power grids that serve them are a tightly integrated system. Electricity customers with environmental objectives have gone to great lengths to ensure their energy procurement creates incremental clean energy that displaces carbon-emitting generation.³

As more electricity customers meet aggressive renewable energy goals through their own strategies, they are turning to look at the whole electricity supply mix to make sure it supports their environmental, reliability, and cost objectives long term. Customers are increasingly focused on ways in which they can engage on and design utility tariffs and policies that increase access to clean energy for all customers. Where individual procurement is not a workable pathway this group may engage in the broader effort to decarbonize the system as a means to realize their renewable energy commitments.

Electricity customers have a significant interest in the wholesale market even though they are

traditionally retail end-users because of existing operations in many states, and an understanding of how wholesale market dynamics affect the quality and price of retail service. While some have commercial building roofs amenable to on-site solar photovoltaics (PV), nearly all electricity customers pursue lower-cost, utility-scale projects. They observe obstacles with integrating renewable energy in today's wholesale power systems, and recognize integration of the whole portfolio must be managed strategically to incorporate as much renewable energy as they want to procure. Further, large electricity customers are asking the question of how to maximize their impact on decarbonizing the system, whether through procurement of renewables or in other ways.

This report builds on the REBA Institute Renewable Energy Policy Pathways Report,⁴ which provides a roadmap to assist large electricity customers in meeting their renewable energy purchasing objectives. The report concludes that an accommodating bulk power system is a pre-condition to electricity customers achieving their ambitious energy goals. This report attempts to paint the rest of the picture beyond retail access to renewable energy, describing what is necessary for the broader bulk power system to support a roadmap for clean, reliable, and efficient for all customers.

This report begins by describing the current state of the electricity portfolio and today's rules and procedures that were developed to manage the resource mix of the past. It then surveys research on the reliable, efficient, and low-carbon resource mix of the future and evaluates and recommends operations, investment structures, and policies to support a clean energy driven resource mix. The report concludes by identifying unanswered questions and areas for further inquiry.

² Brattle Group and REBA Institute, "Renewable Energy Policy Pathways Report."

³ See, e.g., Edison Energy, "Renewable Energy Impact v. Additionality: How and Why PPAs Matter."

⁴ Brattle Group and REBA Institute, "Renewable Energy Policy Pathways Report."

CHAPTER 2:

20TH CENTURY INDUSTRY STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED FOR THE 20TH CENTURY PORTFOLIO


Beginning early in the 20th century, electric power systems around the world followed a common pattern of operation and planning. Policies and procedures were designed to reliably and efficiently manage the portfolio of resources that were available at the time, which were predominantly composed of coal, nuclear, oil, hydropower, and natural gas resources.

Each utility owned a fleet of these plants to serve their territory, and utilities developed policies and procedures for two time frames: operations for hour-to-hour and day-to-day dispatching of the fleet to serve demand (termed “load”) as it cycled up and down each day, and planning for investing in future plants to meet future load growth.

20TH CENTURY OPERATIONS WERE DESIGNED FOR THE 20TH CENTURY FLEET OF RESOURCES

Coal, nuclear, oil, and natural gas plants have certain operational characteristics that led to a particular way of operating the system each hour and day. These plants were typically discrete, large, and inflexible, while load followed a reasonably predictable diurnal pattern – low at night and high during the day. A certain amount of load was present both day and night, called “base load,” while additional load would turn on during the day for manufacturing operations, offices, summer air conditioning, and appliance use, called “peak load” as shown in Figure 1 below.

FIGURE 1
PEAK LOAD AND BASE LOAD




⁵ Sinovoltaics, "Base Load and Peak Load."

The daily cycling between base and peak load led to the operations approach of cycling some units on and off, while leaving other units running all the time. Some units, such as nuclear and low-cost coal units, tended to run all day every day and serve base load. All other units were dispatched in sequential order of lower to higher operating cost to serve peak load, with the most expensive to run units utilized least of all. Dispatching controllable units in economic merit-order to meet predictable load, called *economic dispatch*, became standard practice for operating power systems around the world.

To respect transmission limits, *termed security constraints*, out of merit dispatch would be required every time a lack of transmission

system capacity prevented the least cost generator in a system from serving load. To handle security constraints, standard software and systems protocols were developed to implement *security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED)*, a computational method of minimizing variable operating costs needed to reliably serve load across the entire system, subject to transmission capacity constraints. A SCED optimization could be performed by the utility multiple times a day to meet changing load and flow patterns. Traditional economic dispatch is shown in the form of a supply curve in Figure 2 below with increasing load on the horizontal axis and increasing cost on the vertical axis:

FIGURE 2
HYPOTHETICAL ECONOMIC DISPATCH SUPPLY CURVE FOR SUMMER 2021⁶



⁶ U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Today in Energy: Dispatch Curve."

The traditional fleet also had significant operational constraints and limitations for operators to work around. Most units needed multiple hours or even days of lead time to become operational and incurred additional operating costs for each start up. Operators would address these costs through a separate “unit commitment” optimization, typically a day or two ahead of the operating hour. From a mathematical standpoint, these costs led to much more complicated optimization problems, as there was no smoothly increasing supply curve as the simplified Figure 2 suggests.⁷ These limitations of traditional generators also added costs to the system. Generators needed to be paid enough to cover costs in order to justify starting them up.

20TH CENTURY RESOURCE PLANNING WAS DESIGNED FOR THE 20TH CENTURY PORTFOLIO

In addition to their operations, utilities around the world developed a typical approach to long-term planning to meet long-term demand growth. Transmission, distribution, and conventional generation plants exhibited significant economies of scale, meaning the cost-per-megawatt (MW) was lower for very large plants than for small units. It did not make sense to have two sets of lines running down every street. Economies of scale lead to the economic phenomenon known as “natural monopoly” where high fixed costs create barriers to entry, even if variable costs are low. Through most of the industry’s history, electric utilities fit into the conventional economic framework as natural monopolies, as described

by one of the leading economists in the field of industrial organization: “as long as the tendency prevails for unit costs to decline with an increasing volume of business, because of economies of scale internal to the firm, it is more efficient, other things being equal, to have one supplier than several.”⁸

On the demand side of the industry, long-term electricity load tended to grow predictably multiple percentage points every year. To keep up with expanding load growth, it made sense to invest every few years in discrete, large generators that met system needs and integrated well into the existing portfolio.

A common utility business model was developed to fit these traditional supply and demand characteristics. The structure emerged early in the 20th century, developed by Thomas Edison’s personal secretary, Samuel Insull. Insull established the first electric utilities with a *regulatory compact* that allowed these companies an exclusive monopoly franchise to own and expand their generation, transmission, and distribution capacity, in return for committing to provide minimum levels of service at regulated rates. The monopoly structure allowed the company to take advantage of the large economies of scale. To achieve the coordination required between generation, transmission, and distribution, the utilities were vertically integrated, with a single entity owning all three sectors. Oversight was performed by either an economic regulator for investor-owned utilities, a municipality for municipally owned

⁷ Ramteen, O’Neill, and Oren, “Economic Consequences of Alternative Solution for Centralized Unit Commitment In-Ahead Electricity Markets.

⁸ Kahn, *The Economics of Regulation: Institutional Issues*.

systems, or a cooperative board for consumer-owned systems. This oversight entity would pre-approve investments and authorize cost recovery from retail end-users. Ratemaking followed a standard practice which applied to other regulated industries such as airlines, rail, and telecommunications.⁹ Each generation investment was large and discrete, such that each one was a major public policy decision, with local jobs and tax base implications.

Utility planning and regulation took place over siloed vertical monopolies, with relatively small connections among utility territories and thus among U.S. states. Federal regulation was non-existent until the Supreme Court ruled that states could not regulate inter-state sales, leading Congress to pass the Federal Power Act in 1935 to fill this gap.¹⁰ For most of the 20th century, federal electricity regulation played only a minor role relative to state and local regulation.

INDUSTRY STRUCTURE BEGAN MAJOR CHANGE AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY

Towards the end of the 20th century, a wave of de-regulation took place in the U.S. and abroad covering formerly state-owned or regulated monopoly-owned industries such as railroads, airlines, telecommunications, and trucking.¹¹ As economists began noticing the declining economies of scale in the generation sector of the industry,¹² the electric power sector came under the de-regulation pressures as well. The seeds of third-party, non-utility generation



were sown as part of federal efforts to reduce reliance on foreign oil following the energy crises of the 1970s. Enactment of the 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) required utilities to buy the output from independent suppliers if their resources could provide service at less than the utility's avoided cost. PURPA created a new independent power producer (IPP) industry. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 furthered its growth by easing the regulations on IPPs selling wholesale power. As technologies advanced, the economies of scale in generation continued to decline, which allowed more widespread investment by smaller IPPs and smaller generation projects. Right at the turn of the century there was a large investment in IPP generation, as the share of generation owned by IPPs rose from 1.6 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2002.¹³

The operations and planning and the associated regulatory structure we have inherited from the 20th century were designed to fit the particular resource mix in use then. As we explore in the next chapter, the characteristics of the 21st century resource mix are different in both the operational and long-term investment time horizons. Changes will need to be made in how to operate and invest with the 21st century portfolio.

⁹ For standard ratemaking practices, see Bonbright, Danielsen, and Kamerschen, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, 291.

¹⁰ See Panfil, "From Attleboro to EPSA."

¹¹ See Kahn, *The Economics of Regulation: Institutional Issues*, and Yergin and Stanislav, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy*.

¹² Joskow and Schmalensee, *Markets for Power*.

¹³ Borenstein and Bushnell, *The US Electric Industry 20 Years After Restructuring*.



20th century industry structure
was designed for the 20th
century portfolio

CHAPTER 3:

21ST CENTURY RESOURCE MIX CHARACTERISTICS REQUIRE NEW OPERATIONS AND PLANNING APPROACHES

COST TRENDS HAVE CHANGED THE OUTLOOK FOR ELECTRICITY RESOURCES

Across the energy system there have been a handful of game-changing technologies that have reached the cost and maturity level to be ready for wide deployment. Together, they provide reason to believe that significant decarbonization of power, transportation, and building energy use can be achieved. Power generated by new wind and solar plants is now competitive with that of new and existing fossil fueled plants.¹⁴ LED light bulbs use 75 percent less energy than incandescent bulbs, reducing aggregate consumption materially. Electric heat pumps can reduce energy use by 50 percent, be powered by increasingly clean electricity, and now function in cold climates, promising to displace natural gas and fuel oil for most home and building heating.¹⁵ Lithium-ion batteries

can now power cars, trucks, and portable electronics for sufficiently long periods of time to meet customer driving demands, and the same technology is being used for balancing in electric power systems.

Current trends suggest these technologies are growing, and a significant and rapid evolution of the resource mix is already underway. In the power sector, renewable sources are growing steadily every year while older, less efficient, and higher emitting generating units retire. From 2009-2019, wind and solar power grew from 1.9 percent of the electricity generated in the U.S. to 8.8 percent. Over the same period, coal generation fell from 44 percent to 23 percent of total U.S. generation.¹⁶ Table 1 shows that from 2009 to 2019, aggregate capacity for wind, solar, and battery storage has increased by 184 GW.

TABLE 1
GROWTH IN CLEAN ELECTRICITY¹⁷

Resource	2009 capacity	2019 capacity
Wind	35 GW	108 GW
Solar	1 GW	75 GW
Battery Storage	0.059 GW	1.6 GW

¹⁴ Lazard, "Levelized Cost of Energy and Levelized Cost of Storage – 2020."

¹⁵ U.S. Department of Energy, "Heat Pump Systems."

¹⁶ U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Electric Power Annual 2009," U.S. Energy Information Administration, "What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?"

¹⁷ BloombergNEF and the Business Council for Sustainable Energy, "2020 Sustainable Energy in America Factbook," and U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Battery Storage in the United: An Update on Market," 9.

U.S. coal capacity, on the other hand, is expected to fall by 29 GW as uneconomic plants retire and customer and state preferences, and environmental regulations impact its future prospects.¹⁸

Nuclear capacity is estimated to decrease by 10.5 GW over the next five years, as more plant retirements are expected relative to new construction.¹⁹ In the future, new nuclear technologies could reverse the nuclear decline. Most existing units are expected to stay

on-line since their going-forward costs are likely justified by moderate valuation of their carbon-free attributes²⁰ and states, which often value the jobs they provide, have shown the willingness to support them with public policy. Meanwhile, geothermal and hydroelectric capacity, including pumped hydropower storage remain steady²¹ with opportunities to grow as clean and dispatchable resources, but with more limitations on available sites than wind and solar. Appendix A describes the cost and viability of electricity resources.



FACTORS DRIVING GROWTH OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY

1. **Cost-Competitive Technologies**
2. **State Environmental Objectives**
3. **Electricity Customer Demand**
4. **Fossil Generator Retirements**
5. **Federal Tax Policy**



¹⁸ Bloomberg NEF and the Business Council for Sustainable Energy, "2020 Sustainable Energy in America Factbook," 21.

¹⁹ U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Today in Energy: Three Mile Island Is the Latest Nuclear Power Plant to Announce Retirement Plans."

²⁰ "There are potentially significant savings from retaining the region's most economically competitive nuclear plants." See Hull et al., "Least Cost Carbon Reduction Policies in PJM," 10.

²¹ BloombergNEF and the Business Council for Sustainable Energy, "2020 Sustainable Energy in America Factbook," 23.


CERTAIN COMPONENTS OF THE 21ST CENTURY PORTFOLIO ARE WIDELY AGREED-UPON

Given cost and technology trends described in Appendix A, it is almost inevitable that power systems around the world will increasingly rely on wind and solar energy for a majority of their energy. No other commercially available sources offer large amounts of new low-cost carbon free electricity. All regions of the U.S. and most other countries have ample wind and solar resource availability to support rapid growth.

Future resource portfolio analyses are being studied by many utilities, states, national laboratories, and academic institutions, with results largely consistent across studies. A typical portfolio is shown in Figure 3 from a 2020 report by GridLab and the University of California, and UC Berkeley, with wind and solar making up approximately two-thirds of the energy production in a largely carbon-free supply mix.

FIGURE 3
2035 PORTFOLIO²²

US TOTAL SHARE IN 2035




²² Phadke et al., "2035 The Report: Plummeting Solar, Wind, and Battery Costs Can Accelerate Our Clean Electricity Future."

A 2020 Princeton University-led modeling effort found "that wind and solar power have dominant roles in all pathways," while there was competition between hydropower, nuclear, and fossil with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) for the rest of the portfolio.²³ Figure 4 below from the Princeton study shows wind and solar making up the majority of most portfolios with the low renewable

scenario, labelled E+ RE-, still achieving 48 percent of energy production.

There is little dispute about the quantity or cost of wind and solar energy. The main question for system planners and modelers is how a power system can provide reliable service at all times, given the variable nature of wind and solar output. We turn to that question next.

FIGURE 4
MODELS OF FUTURE ENERGY PORTFOLIOS



²³ Larson et al., "Net Zero America," 88.

AN ELECTRICITY RESOURCE MIX REQUIRES ITS ELEMENTS TO FIT TOGETHER TO MAKE A BALANCED WHOLE

No individual energy source is inherently reliable or unreliable since reliability is a system concept and no power system uses only one source. Rather, certain portfolios can be reliable if operated and planned properly. In this section we address how a clean energy portfolio with wind and solar making up a majority of the energy can work. The next chapter will cover system operations requirements in more detail.

The low-cost clean energy resources discussed above only work if they are part of reliable power system operation. Wind and solar energy output fluctuates with weather. A number of power systems around the world have pioneered new ways of operating to take these characteristics into account, and there is now a rich body of modeling and operating practice showing that systems with high penetrations of renewable energy can maintain reliable service.²⁴

To meet load in all hours there are certain system requirements unique to electricity. Electric demand must equal supply at every moment of every day. If load and generation are not kept in balance, system voltage and frequency deviate, damaging equipment attached to the electric system and potentially leading to a cascading outage. Such an imbalance can happen in a matter of seconds, as various blackouts over the years have demonstrated.²⁵ Although short-duration energy storage is being widely deployed, its total capacity is still capable only

of serving a small fraction of total demand at any given moment. As there are not yet widely deployable, low-cost, longer-duration storage technologies, the need for sufficient generating resources to meet demand at all times will persist. Additionally, to support the stability of system frequency, reserves are needed to rapidly fill in gaps when generation or load changes. Finally, power systems also require voltage support as discussed below.

This section explains how a portfolio of clean energy resources, working together, can meet load all hours of every year and meet other frequency and voltage support requirements.

VARIABILITY OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES IS A KEY FEATURE TO ADDRESS IN SYSTEM OPERATIONS

Each individual resource type presents certain operational capabilities and constraints. For example, renewables provide variable output within a range of uncertain forecasts; storage provides fast and precise dispatchability with a limit to duration of supply; standard existing nuclear plants in the U.S. provide steady output with little flexibility to cycle; and so forth.

The power system has always used a portfolio of generation technologies because few resources economically offer all three of the primary services necessary for reliability: energy, firm (or “dispatchable”) energy, and flexibility. Traditionally, the responsibility for those services were divided between two basic types of generation, as discussed in Chapter 1, flexible peaking capacity resources with a low capital cost and a high cost of energy, and inflexible “baseload” units with a low cost of energy.

²⁴ See International Energy Agency, “Introduction to System Integration of Renewables,” Lew et al., “Secrets of Successful Integration,” and Mai et al., “Renewable Electricity Futures Study: Executive Summary.”

²⁵ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “1996 System Disturbances.”

The future clean resource mix will expand and adjust the portfolio of generation resources. As described in the studies cited above, zero marginal cost renewable resources will provide most of the energy. Dispatchable resources like energy storage will provide capacity and flexibility, but will not add to net energy production.

The variable output of wind, solar, and run-of-river hydropower generation, which can only be dispatched up to the real-time strength of wind speed, solar irradiance, or water flow, is the most well-understood new operational characteristic of a clean electric system. For wind and solar, output for a given resource type will correlate across geographies and as a result present covariate risks; for example, solar resources across a wide region may suffer reduced output simultaneously from a large storm with significant cloud coverage.²⁶

For system operators whose job it is to match supply and demand at every moment, the challenge is that the timing and level of renewable generation output often does not match the timing and level of demand, requiring them to dispatch other energy sources that can change output or “ramp” up or down. The “duck curve” of the California system, which results from high deployments of solar power coming offline as the sun sets, now features a regular

net load (i.e., load minus renewable energy) change of more than 15 GW (or 30 percent of peak demand) over the 3 hours leading into nighttime.²⁷ Grids such as South Australia’s are beginning to experience “minimum generation events” where the daytime production from distributed solar power is leading to the need to “shed generation” that cannot be backed down past a minimum operational level to maintain system stability.²⁸

While both wind and solar facility output vary across days, season, and years,²⁹ the characteristics of that variable output differ by technology. In addition to sub-hourly variability caused by cloud cover,³⁰ solar power production changes predictably across seasons due to the change in daylight availability over the course of the year, with the magnitude of change between winter and summer output more pronounced at higher latitudes.³¹ Additionally, the beginning and ending of daily production moves east-to-west across a given region. Wind power generally has lower sub-hourly variability and higher inter-annual variability,³² which is due to the stronger effect of regional climactic variance on wind resources compared to solar. Additionally, whereas the sun comes up every day, wind output can fluctuate over long periods and presents the possibility of a multi-day lack of significant production.³³

²⁶ See for example Thomas Hoff and Perez, “PV Power Output Variability: Calculation of Correlation Coefficients Using Satellite Insolation Data.”

²⁷ CAISO, “Draft Flexible Capacity Needs Assessment for 2020.”

²⁸ Australian Energy Market Operator, “Minimum Operational Demand Thresholds in South Australia.”

²⁹ Kumler et al., “Inter-Annual Variability of Wind and Solar Electricity Generation and Capacity Values in Texas.”

³⁰ Mills et al., “Understanding Variability and Uncertainty of Photovoltaics for Integration with the Electric Power System.”

³¹ Jacobson and Jadhav, “World Estimates of PV Optimal Tilt Angles and Ratios of Sunlight Incident upon Tilted and Tracked PV Panels Relative to Horizontal Panels.”

³² Wan, “Long-Term Wind Power Variability.”

³³ See Morison, “Britain Has Gone Nine Days Without Wind Power.”



In addition to this divergence between timing of demand and renewables supply, a future portfolio with significant bulk-scale wind and solar resources will diverge in terms of location of supply and demand. Wind and solar resources are location-constrained to regions with the highest quality resources and where sufficient land is available to realize economies of scale. Technological advances, such as increases in wind hub height and blade length and solar conversion efficiencies, may unlock geographies for deployment that are not economical today. However, the sheer magnitude of needed deployments is likely to dominate this effect and produce a system that relies significantly on geographic movement of energy to ensure it is delivered to the location of demand. Technology also cannot overcome the fundamental physical fact that wind and solar plants in good resource areas are at least twice as productive as those in lower-quality resource areas.³⁴

System variability may increase at certain times and places from demand side as well

as renewable sources. Electrification of other sectors of the economy will change load levels and load shapes, while also potentially adding a large amount of flexibility. Electrification of building and water heating loads, particularly in cold-weather regions, will likely increase winter peak demands significantly above shoulder seasons and cause some regions to switch from summer- to winter-peaking systems.³⁵ Electrification of transportation may create more frequent and steeper peaks in demand, both on the system overall and within specific locations, depending on the extent to which the charging of electric vehicles is coordinated or responsive to price signals.³⁶

The predictability of the local variations in wind and solar generation allows system operators to integrate these characteristics into their operations and planning. The system operators' challenges and opportunities are explored in Chapter 4. The rest of this chapter looks more closely at renewable generation profiles and describes other technical considerations for a low-carbon electricity system.

³⁴ American Wind Energy Association, "Grid Vision: The Electric Highway to a 21st Century Economy," 33.

³⁵ Vibrant Clean Energy, "Minnesota's Smarter Grid: Pathways Toward a Clean, Reliable and Affordable Transportation and Energy System."

³⁶ Bedir et al., "California Plug-In Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Projections: 2017-2025."


A MAJORITY RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO CAN MEET LOAD IN ALL HOURS

A useful metaphor for describing the power system is that of an orchestra where each resource serves as an instrument section and the grid operator serves as a conductor. While some specialization has always existed with certain units meeting baseload and other units cycling to meet peak load, the future portfolio has more unique roles and responsibilities. This has implications for how the orchestra of the grid is assembled (planned) and conducted (operated).

One can visualize how a clean energy portfolio meets load by looking at plots of hour-by-hour dispatch of a reliable low carbon power system. Figure 5 shows output by each resource as modeled in for a summer month in 2050 for the Eastern Interconnection with a portfolio that is over 80 percent renewable energy and

emits 95 percent less carbon than today. The red areas show solar output each day while the green area shows wind output relative to the black line which is total load. Wind and solar tend to complement each other by producing at different times. The orange area shows short-duration batteries filling in gaps and helping to meet evening air conditioning load for a few hours after the sun goes down. The light blue on top shows curtailed output when there is excess supply, which is part of a least cost portfolio even though it is wasted energy. The gray area shows how the existing gas fleet can be used as a dispatchable source of stand-by power to fill remaining gaps. With low-cost renewables that often do not produce at the time and location of load, curtailment is likely to be more prevalent. It is clear from observing power system operations and such models that each resource plays a distinct role and only together can they meet load at all times.

FIGURE 5
MODELED OUTPUT BY RESOURCE FOR JUNE 2050 IN THE EASTERN INTERCONNECTION³⁷



²⁴ Clack et al., "Consumer, Employment, and Environmental Benefits of Electricity Transmission Expansion in the Eastern U.S." See also resources here: Future Power Markets Forum, "Reliable, Efficient, and Low-Carbon Resource Portfolios," and Slusarewicz and Cohan, "Assessing Solar and Wind Complementarity in Texas," Sepulveda et al., "The Role of Firm Low-Carbon Electricity Resources in Deep Decarbonization of Power Generation," Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc., "Study of Policies to Decarbonize Electric Sector in the Northwest I Public Generating Pool, 2017 – Present," and Berghout, van dan Broek, and Worrell, "Synergies Between Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency."


The portfolio effect can also be seen when looking at each resource's contribution to meeting load. A physical feature of power systems is that variable resources with correlated output patterns provide diminishing marginal contributions to meeting peak demand as their penetration increases. On a power system with limited dispatchability, the first 100 MW of a solar resource would assist in meeting peak load during, for example, a hot summer afternoon and would reduce the capacity needed from other sources by 100 MW. But if a system already has very high solar penetration, there tends to be a surplus of energy in the afternoon when the sun is shining, and the next 100 MW plant does not help the system meet demand when it

will be needed. At higher solar penetrations, the time of greatest energy scarcity becomes the early evening after the sun sets and customer demands remain high. Using the orchestra metaphor above, a certain number of cellos are needed, but so are other strings, as well as brass, woodwinds, and percussion.

The contribution of resources to meeting system peak load is called *capacity value*.³⁸ Capacity value measures the ability of a resource to serve load at times of system need, or when scarcity may occur. As shown in Figure 6, solar capacity values are estimated to range from around 30 percent to 75 percent at penetration levels below 5 percent; however, estimated capacity values decline at higher penetration levels.

FIGURE 6

DECLINING CAPACITY VALUE OF SOLAR ENERGY AS PENETRATION INCREASES³⁹



³⁸ It is different from the more commonly known "capacity factor," which measures energy output as a ratio of total possible output over a period of time.


³⁹ U.S. Department of Energy, "Maintaining Reliability in the Modern Power System," 11.

Wind and storage experience declining marginal capacity value like solar. Probabilistic analysis for PJM Interconnection (PJM),⁴⁰ New York Independent System Operator (NYISO),⁴¹ and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)⁴² shows that with today's generation patterns, battery storage offers full capacity value for 4-hour battery penetrations up to around several percent of system peak, and then the marginal capacity value begins to gradually decline.⁴³ As explained by Denholm et al., "as more storage is deployed, the peaking events it serves become longer—so storage must serve a wider part of the demand curve." Wind and solar capacity values plotted against penetration are shown in Figure 7, illustrating different decline rates based on statistical covariance among plants of the

same technology - wind has more geographic diversity in its output patterns, while solar output at any two sites is highly correlated.⁴⁴ Capacity value is measured by "Effective Load Carrying Capability" (ELCC), shown on the vertical axis.

The implication of the declining capacity value of wind, solar, and energy-limited resources is that a portfolio approach is necessary. No single resource type can meet all load, but rather each resource plays a different role as members of an orchestra play different parts. In this way, the components of the clean energy portfolio will not be in competition with each other so much as they fill the role or roles to which they are most suited.

FIGURE 7
WIND AND SOLAR CAPACITY VALUES VS. PENETRATION



⁴⁰ See Carden, Wintermantel, and Krasny, "Capacity Value of Energy Storage in PJM," and Carden, Wintermantel, and Krasny, "Load Shape Development and Energy Limited Resource Capacity Valuation."

⁴¹ Carden, "Valuing Capacity for Resources with Energy Limitations –Preliminary Independent Assessment."

⁴² Denholm et al., "The Potential for Battery Energy Storage to Provide Peaking Capacity in the United States."

⁴³ For storage, see Denholm et al., "The Potential for Battery Energy Storage to Provide Peaking Capacity in the United States," and Parks, "Declining Capacity Credit for Energy Storage and Demand Response With Increased Penetration."

⁴⁴ MISO, "Renewable Integration Impact Assessment," 30.

Wind, solar, and storage increase the capacity value of each other, so that their combined capacity value is greater than the sum of their parts. Because wind and solar output tend to occur at different times (i.e., in most regions wind produces more power at night and less power during the summer, the opposite of solar), incremental solar offers more capacity value on a power system with a high wind penetration, and vice versa. To some extent, certain resources fit together particularly well. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) found that on a power system with 10 percent of its energy provided by solar, the capacity value of short-duration battery energy storage declines half as fast as on a power system with no solar.⁴⁵ This occurs because solar helps meet peak load during the late afternoon, shortening the duration of the peak net load period to a few hours in the early evening and allowing limited duration batteries to better meet the peak.

A recent report found that roughly the same penetration levels of wind, solar, and storage were deployed under varying low-carbon scenarios as they each played unique roles meeting load at different times and places, regardless of their relative costs.⁴⁶ The same report, along with many others, also found a unique need and role for transmission and the spatial movement of power, to which we turn next.



⁴⁵ Denholm et al., “The Potential for Battery Energy Storage to Provide Peaking Capacity in the United States.”

⁴⁶ See Clack et al., “Consumer, Employment, and Environmental Benefits of Electricity Transmission Expansion in the Eastern U.S.,” sections 6 and 8.

SPATIAL MOVEMENT OF POWER WILL BE NEEDED

For wind and solar energy to make large contributions to meeting load at all times, studies and operational experience indicate that large amounts of power must move across and between states and regions. Two physical phenomena are at work: (1) high quality, low-cost renewable resources are often located in areas remote from load, and the (2) variability and covariation of renewable output means that aggregating projects across a region creates a steadier aggregate supply than can be achieved at any given location.

A portfolio of wind and solar resources operated together produces output less variable and uncertain than that of any single resource, as it has greatly reduced exposure to localized weather events.⁴⁷ The covariate risk of renewable output being unavailable is reduced by aggregations across larger geographies and multiple resource types.⁴⁸ Weather events have limited geographic breadth, causing more distant wind or solar resources to have less correlated output. The correlation of output between two neighboring wind plants is close to 100 percent, while plants in the Midwest 400 miles away are only 20-35 percent correlated.⁴⁹ Every region will have somewhat different correlation coefficients, but this dynamic shows up in experiences and models around the world. As a result, aggregations of resources across

larger geographies allow renewable energy to make up a greater share of the supply needed for overall system reliability.

The need to move power between regions was shown on a macro level in the NREL Interconnections Seam study, which allowed power to be transferred between the Eastern and Western Interconnections under three different transmission expansion scenarios. As shown in Figure 8, the study found that approximately 20 GW more energy, or twice as much, would be transferred between the Eastern and Western interconnections on a day-to-day basis in a high variable generation future compared to a low variable generation base case. The study found a need for 40,000-60,000 GW-miles of Alternating Current (AC) and up to 63,000 GW-miles of Direct Current (DC) transmission for one scenario. Transmission is measured in GW-miles, which is delivering one GW for one mile. The U.S. has approximately 150,000 GW-miles in operation today, so the need is about a two-thirds increase in transmission capacity to produce 74 percent of the energy from carbon-free sources. Importantly, the power moves back and forth, as shown below, demonstrating the optionality provided by transmission. Positive flow indicates net export from east to west, and negative flow indicates net imports to the east from the west, recorded in Eastern Standard Time.

⁴⁷ Hoff and Perez, "PV Power Output Variability: Calculation of Correlation Coefficients Using Satellite Insolation Data."

⁴⁸ As a recent study in Nature Climate Change concluded "the average variability of weather decreases as size increases; if wind or solar power are not available in a small area, they are more likely to be available somewhere in a larger area." The study notes that "paradoxically, the variability of the weather can provide the answer to its perceived problems." See MacDonald et al., "Future Cost-Competitive Electricity Systems and Their Impact on US CO₂ Emissions." See also Shaner, Matthew R., et al., "Geophysical Constraints on the Reliability of Solar and Wind Power in the United States," 914. Additionally, a database of studies on complementarity among renewables can be found in Jurasz et al., "A Review on the Complementarity of Renewable Energy Sources."


⁴⁹ Van Horn, Pfeifenberger, and Ruiz, "The Value of Diversifying Uncertain Renewable Generation through the Transmission System," 10, and Osborn, "Lessons Learned in Wind Generation."

Similarly, the aforementioned study finds necessary inter-state transfers of power to increase from 90 GW in 2018 to 760 GW in 2050 under either a high wind or high solar case.⁵¹ The report concludes, “regardless of future trends in carbon emissions or wind and solar costs, large amounts of new high-capacity transmission will be required.”⁵² More than 140,000 GW-miles of transmission were added in the scenarios, approximately doubling the delivery capacity of the current grid, with wind and solar providing over 70 percent of generation.

The Princeton University Net Zero America study described above found “high voltage transmission capacity expands ~60 percent by 2030 and triples through 2050 to connect wind and solar facilities to demand; total capital invested in transmission is \$360 billion through 2030 and \$2.4 trillion by 2050.”⁵³

FIGURE 8

Power transfer between the eastern and western interconnections in a low and high renewable penetration scenario⁵⁰



⁵⁰ Bloom et al., “The Value of Increased HVDC Capacity Between Eastern and Western U.S. Grids: The Interconnections Seam Study,” 7.

⁵¹ Unpublished data from authors. Note that these numbers reflect transfers across multiple states and in some cases power moves across many states.

⁵² Clack et al., “Consumer, Employment, and Environmental Benefits of Electricity Transmission Expansion in the Eastern U.S,” 20.

⁵³ Larson et al., “Net Zero America,” 77.


A North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) task force similarly found that “The benefits of larger balancing areas with fewer transmission constraints can be substantial. Resolving transmission constraints is critical because larger balancing areas lose many of the benefits associated with size if constraints are in play.”⁵⁴ It also explained, “Variability and uncertainty can be reduced through aggregation. Larger aggregations of wind and solar generation are proportionately less variable. Forecast accuracy is also improved for larger wind and solar aggregations. Net variability is reduced when variable energy resources (VERs) are aggregated with load, and it is net variability that must be balanced to

maintain reliability. The pool of flexible resources, like generators and responsive load, increases as the size of the balancing authorities (BAs) is increased. Balancing should be conducted over the largest geographic area possible, either through consolidating smaller BAs or through coordinated operations.”⁵⁵

Consistent with the Eastern Interconnect study discussed above, the NREL-led Renewable Energy Futures study, found a need for 200,000 GW-miles of transmission to meet a national 80 percent renewable energy goal. Figure 9 shows this transmission need as it relates to renewable energy penetration.

FIGURE 9

NREL renewable energy futures transmission needs⁵⁶




⁵⁴ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Integration of Variable Generation Task Force,” 46.

⁵⁵ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Integration of Variable Generation Task Force,” 56.

⁵⁶ Mai et al., “Renewable Electricity Futures Study: Executive Summary,” 27.

The NREL REF scenario shows transmission expansion needs superimposed on a map of the lower 48 states:

FIGURE 10
NREL renewable energy futures transmission map⁵⁷




⁵⁷ Ibid.,27.

The Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative (EIPC), funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, also found the need for transmission expansion in the Eastern interconnection. The report found that scenarios with a carbon constraint and renewable portfolio standard are expected to require up to \$115 and \$80 billion worth of transmission expansion respectively because more transmission needed for the national carbon constraint than the regionally implemented

Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), between 2015 and 2030. The expansion, however, is expected to introduce annual operating cost savings corresponding to \$52.6 billion and \$9.7 billion, respectively, for each scenario.⁵⁸ This shows that the transmission needed for renewable energy integration and power balance also pays for itself by accessing low-cost generation and enabling more efficient power system operations. The EIPC carbon constrained scenario found the need for transmission in the areas shown in Figure 11.

FIGURE 11

EIPC transmission needs for carbon-constrained scenario⁵⁹



⁵⁸ See Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative, "Phase 2 Report: Interregional Transmission Development and Analysis for Three Stakeholder Selected Scenarios and Gas-Electric System Interface Study," 5-6, and Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative, "Phase 2 Report: Interregional Transmission Development and Analysis for Three Stakeholder Selected Scenarios and Gas-Electric System Interface Study," CR-16.

⁵⁹ Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative, "Phase 2 Report: Interregional Transmission Development and Analysis for Three Stakeholder Selected Scenarios and Gas-Electric System Interface Study," CR-10.

Geographic movements of power are also required at high penetrations of distributed solar resources. At low solar penetrations distributed PV may not increase transmission needs much, but at high penetrations distributed solar creates just as much need as utility-scale solar for transmission to export solar during the day and import other resources at night.⁶⁰


Finally, one other study by MIT researchers found that inter-state coordination and transmission expansion reduces the cost of zero-carbon electricity by up to 46 percent compared to a state-by-state approach.⁶¹ To achieve these cost reductions the study found

a need for approximately doubling transmission capacity, and “even in the “5x transmission cost” case there are substantial transmission additions.”⁶² Figure 12 from this study shows tens of GWs transferred between regions enabled by inter-regional transmission.

In all studies reviewed here, it is clear that clean power needs to move around geographically, and this finding is not very sensitive to future changes in absolute or relative costs of wind, solar, storage, and transmission resources. The role of gas, CCS, nuclear, and other resources does vary in different estimates based on their relative costs.⁶⁴ Regional power movement, just like wind and solar energy, fills a unique

FIGURE 12

Inter-regional transfers of power for a decarbonized grid⁶³



⁶⁰ See Clack et al., “Why Local Solar For All Costs Less: A New Roadmap for the Lowest Cost Grid.” See also Clack, Choululkar, and McKee, “Energy Imbalance Market Options for Colorado,” showing significant transmission needs even with full DER optimization.

⁶¹ Brown and Botterud, “The Value of Inter-Regional Coordination and Transmission in Decarbonizing the US Electricity System.”

⁶² Ibid., 12.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Larson et al., “Net Zero America,”

role in the clean energy portfolio. Energy storage helps balance supply and demand locally and can increase the utilization rates of transmission lines by absorbing wind or solar generation that would have been curtailed and releasing it when the transmission is no longer congested. However, energy storage itself is unable to move power from region to region.⁶⁵

Transmission is needed regardless of how much future energy is provided by distributed energy resources (DERs). In a recent analysis of the benefits of incorporating large amounts of DERs, the detailed modeling study found that almost the same amount of transmission was needed with or without a large amount of DERs.⁶⁶

Importantly, increasing transmission capacity is cheaper than the equivalent expansion in supply resources to meet system reliability. A thorough survey of research on power system needs for decarbonization by Peter Fox-Penner in his book *Power after Carbon*, concluded, “These modeling efforts consistently find that adding large amounts of big wind and solar projects in areas where these resources are best, and building more transmission to reach them, beats the cost of adding only local power and storage without grid expansion.”⁶⁷



Cost of transmission was incorporated into these system models. Fox-Penner notes that “transmission lines, while unsightly, are inexpensive compared to all types of generators and storage, and themselves have economies of scale.”⁶⁸ A study by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) scientists found transmission for a high renewable portfolio costs between \$1/MWh and \$10/MWh,⁶⁹ which equals around one-fifth of the cost of generation.

⁶⁵ See Clack et al., “Consumer, Employment, and Environmental Benefits of Electricity Transmission Expansion in the Eastern U.S.,” 23, Vibrant Clean Energy, “Minnesota’s Smarter Grid: Pathways Toward a Clean, Reliable and Affordable Transportation and Energy System,” and Clack, “Modernizing Minnesota’s Grid: An Economic Analysis of Energy Storage Opportunities MISO-Wide Electricity Co-Optimized Planning Scenarios.”

⁶⁶ Clack et al., “Why Local Solar For All Costs Less: A New Roadmap for the Lowest Cost Grid,” 53.

⁶⁷ Fox-Penner, *Power After Carbon*, 60.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 61.

⁶⁹ Gorman, Mills, and Wiser, “Improving Estimates of Transmission Capital Costs for Utility-Scale Wind and Solar Projects to Inform Renewable Energy Policy.”

TIME-SHIFTING AND FLEXIBILITY WILL BE NEEDED

Along with moving power spatially across regions, future power systems will require fast-responding resources to handle sudden imbalances. With more variable resources on the system that are not perfectly predictable, it will be necessary to shift consumption and production over time with storage and other flexible resources. At certain times, wind and solar energy will supply most or all of demand. At other times, other resources will be needed. These balancing resources will be needed in multiple time scales, from milliseconds to minutes to hours, days, seasons, and even years to address variability in each time frame.


The NREL 80 percent Renewable Energy Futures study found that load could be met at all times if more sources of flexibility were engaged:

“The central conclusion of the analysis is that renewable electricity generation from technologies that are commercially available today, in combination with a more flexible electric system, is more than adequate to supply 80 percent of total U.S. electricity generation in 2050 while meeting electricity demand on an hourly basis in every region of the United States...RE Futures finds that increased electric system flexibility, needed to enable electricity supply-demand balance with high levels of renewable generation, can come from a portfolio of supply- and demand-side options, including flexible conventional generation, grid storage, new transmission, more responsive loads, and changes in power system operations.”⁷⁰

Flexibility sources exist on a supply curve of various options with different costs. Figure 13 shows lower cost options on the lower left and higher cost options on the upper right. To achieve very high penetrations of renewable energy, most or all of these options will likely be needed.

⁷⁰ Mai et al., “Renewable Electricity Futures Study: Executive Summary,” iii.

FIGURE 13
Flexibility supply curve⁷¹



⁷¹ Pérez-Arriaga et al., "Adapting Market Design to High Shares of Variable Renewable Energy."

Many resources including natural gas, hydro, and others would likely shift to operate more as flexible balancing resources than energy sources in a high renewable energy portfolio.⁷² With high levels renewable energy levels on a system, energy will be plentiful but flexibility and capacity will be more in demand and valuable. One recent study by Energy and Environmental Economics (E3) for the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) found

“One overarching trend across all scenarios is that flexible thermal resources such as gas plants, tend to decrease as a share of energy supply over time while maintaining their share of system capacity. In effect, [the model] shows gas generation increasingly displaced by renewables over time but maintains gas capacity to ensure reliability requirements are met and thermal generation can ramp up to serve periods of low renewable energy supply.”⁷³

Another study for the Pacific Northwest found that new gas plants were needed but would only operate at 3 percent capacity factor.⁷⁴ The GridLab/UC Berkeley 2035 report found “Of the 360 GW of natural gas dispatch in 2035 under the 90% lean case, 70 GW has a capacity factor below 1%.”⁷⁵ A challenge for electricity policy makers is to assign the costs of these rarely-used resources, as we will discuss in Chapter 5.

Hydropower will also likely shift from producing MWh to serving as a source of capacity and flexibility, which will be more valued in a high renewable energy portfolio. Northern European power systems, for example, have shifted to send excess renewable power to Scandinavia, where hydropower plants are dispatched down and store energy in their reservoirs, and then later release that energy at times of low renewable output. Hydro-based systems in East Africa are adding dispatchability capabilities to help balance systems as wind and solar increase. Canada has significant reservoirs of hydro in British Columbia, Manitoba, and Quebec that could be used as part of a more integrated North American power systems to help with balancing, especially since it is a rare source of low-cost long-duration storage.⁷⁶ Some new opportunities exist to develop pumped storage to provide shorter-term flexibility.

Another way to smooth out excesses and shortages is to produce hydrogen with surplus renewable output during those time periods.⁷⁷ As noted earlier, excess renewable electricity can be used to create a range of hydrogen-based fuels, which can help with seasonal imbalances, taking advantage of surplus renewable energy in the spring and fall when there isn't much demand for heating or cooling. Hydrogen-based fuels could also be burned in retrofitted natural gas plants to provide a clean firm source to support resource adequacy.

⁷² See Bradbury, “Implications of Intermittency,” And Pöyry, “The Challenges of Intermittency in North West European Power Markets: The Impacts When Wind and Solar Development Reach Their Target.”

⁷³ Hull et al., “Least Cost Carbon Reduction Policies in PJM,” 29.

⁷⁴ Ming et al., “Resource Adequacy in the Pacific Northwest,” 43.

⁷⁵ Phadke et al., “2035 The Report: Plummeting Solar, Wind, and Battery Costs Can Accelerate Our Clean Electricity Future,” 19.

⁷⁶ See National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “North American Renewable Integration Study.”

⁷⁷ Wartsila Energy, “Path to 100% Renewables for California.”

VOLTAGE NEEDS TO BE MAINTAINED

Reactive power and voltage support are also needed to maintain the stable and efficient flow of power on the transmission system.⁷⁸

Renewable and storage resources can provide this service, including when they are not otherwise supplying real power - solar plants can provide this service at night by running grid power through their inverters to provide reactive power. However, reactive power does not travel well on the grid. Therefore, renewable and storage resources may need to be distributed geographically to efficiently meet the need everywhere or else be complemented by other voltage and reactive power sources.

In addition to meeting load and providing inertia, grid strength is another reliability requirement.⁷⁹ Grid strength is a measure of the voltage support of a system provided by synchronous generators and synchronous condensers. Unlike frequency, the location of voltage support matters as certain parts of the grid can be weaker than others, requiring additional voltage support. High penetration

of inverter-based resources and the retirement of synchronous generators in certain areas can harm grid strength, especially where transmission capacity is limited. These situations can occur in remote renewable resource areas and is thus particularly relevant for planning a reliable, efficient, and low carbon system. Grid-forming inverter technology could be developed in the future to support grid strength.⁸⁰ Transmission investments can help strengthen grids, but without any other such solution, minimum levels of synchronous generation may be needed in these areas to support voltage. This will likely continue to be mostly addressed by transmission planning and the interconnection process which drives the decision to build transmission, tune generator controls, or, in the future, use wind, solar, and storage resources with grid-forming converters; However, these processes can include some operational aspects like paying a synchronous condenser for its real power consumption while operating.

⁷⁸ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, **Order No. 827**, 155 FERC ¶ 61,277.

⁷⁹ North American Reliability Corporation, “**Integrating Inverter-Based Resources into Low Short Circuit Strength Systems.**”

⁸⁰ GridLab and ESIG, “**10 Things You Should Know about Grid-Forming Inverters.**”


LOSS OF INERTIA AND FREQUENCY SUPPORT NEEDS TO BE MANAGED

Frequency response is an increase in generation used to stabilize power system frequency in the seconds and minutes following the unexpected loss of a large generator.⁸¹ Today, this is mostly provided by conventional generators temporarily increasing their output, with the rotational inertia of all operating conventional generators and many motor loads slowing the decline in frequency until those generators have enough time to respond. Storage, and in some cases wind and solar resources, can provide frequency response much more quickly than conventional generators.⁸² While storage, wind, and solar

resources do not provide true instantaneous inertia, their primary frequency response is so fast (e.g., a few milliseconds response) that it offsets some of the need for inertia. Because conventional generators provide frequency response and inertia at near-zero cost, there is no market for these services today; rather, conventional generators are supposed to provide frequency response (though many do not) to comply with the grid code. Eventually power systems can be designed to operate with very low or zero inertia;⁸³ in the interim, some regions are implementing minimum inertia requirements as a constraint in system unit commitment and dispatch.

FIGURE 14

2050 incremental cost of GHG reduction scenarios with and without firm, carbon-free resource options⁸⁴



⁸¹ See North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "Fast Frequency Response Concepts and Bulk Power System Reliability Needs," and Electric Power Research Institute, "Ancillary Services in the United States: Technical Requirements, Market Designs and Price Trends."

⁸² For solar energy's ability to provide frequency support, see Energy and Environmental Economics, "Investigating the Economic Value of Flexible Solar Power Plant Operation."

⁸³ Denholm et al., "Inertia and the Power Grid: A Guide Without the Spin," 33.

⁸⁴ Hull et al., "Least Cost Carbon Reduction Policies in PJM," 53.

THERE IS TIME TO FIGURE OUT THE LAST 10 PERCENT

Many studies, including those referenced in this report, reach 90 percent decarbonization and 80 percent renewable energy without significant technical or economic barriers. However, the last 10 percent of decarbonization cannot be achieved on many systems at low cost with known and commercially available technology.

Unless systems have high levels of hydropower, there tends to be an inflection point in cost around 80 or 90 percent decarbonization. Figure 14 shows a typical increasing slope as carbon reductions approach 100 percent if there is no carbon-free firm resource available.

The known and commercially available resources that can provide long-duration output when wind and solar are not available are natural gas and nuclear fleets, as long as they stay on-line. While natural gas plants emit carbon, their total emissions can be reduced significantly from today's levels even without carbon capture by dispatching only rarely in those times where wind, solar, energy storage, and demand response cannot deliver. To reach zero carbon, these natural gas units would need to be replaced by some alternative carbon-free firm resource. This resource type has been called a *clean firm* source.⁸⁵ There are a number of options including fossil units with carbon capture and storage, geothermal, flexible nuclear, and power-to-gas hydrogen. Another option for North America would be to utilize the very large existing hydro reservoirs in Canada, which could balance U.S. regions if there were a high-capacity macro grid to connect it. Bringing the costs down for clean firm sources should be a focus of public and private sector R&D.

A sensible power sector decarbonization strategy therefore is to do what is known now to build the known clean energy portfolio that can achieve 90 percent emissions reduction while working to invent and improve clean firm sources for the last 10 percent.



⁸⁵ Sepulveda, Jenkins, de Sisternes, and Lester, *The Role of Firm Low-Carbon Electricity Resources in Deep Decarbonization of Power Generation*.

SUMMARY OF MANAGING THE 21ST CENTURY PORTFOLIO

The foregoing survey of research on portfolios shows a reasonably consistent set of resources that fit together to form a low-cost, reliable, and low emission portfolio. Together they can achieve around 90 percent decarbonization of the power sector with known commercially available technology, leaving a need for R&D on the last 10 percent. The likely portfolio includes:

- **Solar energy**

Likely the lowest cost carbon-free source in most areas

- **Wind energy, both on and offshore**

Also very low cost carbon-free energy, and tends to operate at times when solar does not

- **Short-duration battery energy storage**

Low-cost source of fast ramping and balancing, helps optimize (raise utilization) of transmission

- **Demand response**

Low-cost source of ramping and balancing

- **Transmission**

The only way to physically move power spatially

- **Firming resources**

For times of day, season, and year with high net load. Likely the existing gas fleet for the next decade, and could be a clean long duration storage source in the future

Large electricity customers can consider expanding their business activity beyond renewable energy procurement into these complementary sectors, which are all needed and likely to grow in the future.

A GRID OPERATOR WILL NEED TO ASSEMBLE THE ORCHESTRA OF RESOURCES

Many power systems are reaching penetration levels grid managers once believed were never possible. One grid operator CEO stated in testimony to the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee: *"It was assumed a decade ago, when wind comprised less than one percent of SPP's (Southwest Power Pool's) generation mix, that an ISO (Independent System Operator)/RTO (Regional Transmission Organization) could never serve more than 20 to 30 percent of its load reliably with a variable resource like wind. Today, it's the second most-prevalent fuel source in the SPP region, making up over 25 percent of our energy generated this year, behind only coal, and serves continually more and more of our load without any undesirable impacts to reliability."*⁸⁶ He described how operating the system as a portfolio with sufficient ability to move the power around the region as the keys to this success: *"Successful integration of wind and other renewable and variable energy resources is dependent on enabling transmission infrastructure, consolidated BAs [balancing authorities], and effective market processes. Such high levels of wind and other variable energy resources could not be reliably dispatched without sufficient transmission to move energy from where it's generated to where it's needed."*⁸⁷ Electricity policy and economic structures must be based on how a future power system would physically work with most energy coming from wind and solar.

Just as an orchestra can only play nice music when well-conducted, the power system requires a conductor. The power system conductor is a grid operator. We turn to the grid operator and how they manage a system with high renewable penetration system next.

⁸⁶ Brown, *Powering America: A Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the Nation's Wholesale Electricity Markets*.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER 4:

A NEW SHORT-RUN OPERATIONS APPROACH FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PORTFOLIO

Short-term electric system operations will need to adapt to ensure the future clean energy portfolio is reliable and efficient. The future portfolio of clean energy resources will possess different operational characteristics than the supply mix we have inherited, as described in Chapter 4. This chapter describes necessary system operations to integrate all the pieces into a working whole on an hour-to-hour and day-to-day basis; in other words, how the orchestra of a clean energy portfolio can be conducted.

OPERATE AS A LARGER REGIONAL SYSTEM

As previously discussed, large spatial movement of power across and among regions will be needed both to access high quality resource areas and achieve a steady aggregate supply of energy. Spatial movement of power will require infrastructure as described in Chapter 6, and also large regional balancing areas.

Even before renewable energy entered power systems, one of the main changes to industry structure was to create large Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) that could


efficiently dispatch hundreds of generators across large areas and capture the benefits of load diversity. Assessments of the impacts of RTO/ISOs on costs to load show significant net benefits from joint dispatch and reduced transmission charges across large areas, relative to the earlier more balkanized system of siloed utilities independently dispatching and each system charging for fixed transmission costs for transferring power across.⁸⁸ These studies find that seamless free flow of energy across a large region, without the need to physically schedule or pay capacity charges across each utility system, enables more efficient system dispatch.

The movement to RTOs has consolidated from hundreds of separate “balancing areas” to a smaller number of larger areas that can efficiently pool generation and load. Further consolidation of BAs is still needed in the Western and Southeastern U.S., where there are a far greater number of small BAs than elsewhere in the country (see Figure 15) and subsequently significant inefficiencies for moving clean energy across them.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Cicala, “Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation,” Brown and Botterud, “The Value of Inter-Regional Coordination and Transmission in Decarbonizing the US Electricity System,” and Potomac Economics, “OMS-RSC Seams Study: Market-to-Market Coordination.” See also Midcontinent Independent System Operator, “MISO Value Proposition,” and PJM, “PJM Value Proposition.”

⁸⁹ See Paulos, “A Regional Power Market for the West: Risks and Benefits.” See also Gimon et al., “Economic and Clean Energy Benefits of Establishing a Southeast U.S. Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market,” and Cicala, “Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation.”

FIGURE 15
The many balancing areas of the U.S.⁹⁰



Large electricity customers can find greater options in larger operating areas. Customers looking to achieve a steadier supply of energy that they can receive from renewable projects at one location will be able to access resources that operate at different times when regional markets are broad.

To achieve large regional operation, there must be a single regional grid operator. RTOs are the institutions that can operate large regional spot markets in the U.S. RTOs can efficiently coordinate congestion management and flexibility service procurement in real time across large geographies with their dispatch system. In theory, some alternative organizational structure such as a region-wide transmission-only company ("transco") could also perform these regional system and

market operations functions,⁹¹ but that would require extensive corporate restructurings and regulatory approvals to cover a large geographic area. The concept of the RTO (also known as Independent System Operator (ISO)) was originally created to provide the benefits of regional operation and planning without the need for such corporate restructuring.

RTOs and ISOs cover about two-thirds of the U.S. and have demonstrated significant benefits to consumers over the last 25 years.⁹² As stated by a Department of Energy-led (DOE) multi-laboratory study,⁹³ the current system of many smaller balancing areas places a ceiling on the ability aggregate a large and diverse set of renewable power sources and inefficiently limits otherwise feasible power flows.

⁹⁰ EIA, *Energy Today*.

⁹¹ Arizu, Dunn Jr., and Tenenbaum, "Transmission System Operators: Lessons From The Frontlines."

⁹² Chang, Pfeifenberger, and Tsoukalis, "Potential Benefits of a Regional Power Market to North Carolina's Electricity Customers."

⁹³ U.S. Department of Energy, "Wind Vision: A New Era for Wind Power in the United States," 89.

Where RTOs do not exist, there is inefficient physical scheduling of transmission and capacity-based transmission service reservations, hindering the free flow of electricity across utility systems. To move power across multiple transmission systems, a transmission customer must pay multiple rates, known as “pancaked rates.” FERC has attempted to eliminate pancaked rates for over 20 years saying, “the elimination of rate pancaking for large regions is a central goal of the Commission’s RTO policy, and has been a feature of all five ISOs the Commission had approved.”⁹⁴ RTOs eliminate inefficient physical transmission scheduling and pancaked rates.⁹⁵ While energy imbalance markets can reduce rate pancaking,⁹⁶ they do not have the full coordinated dispatch and commitment provided by RTOs. Any remaining seams between RTOs should be operated in a close coordinated fashion such that efficient exchanges are not artificially discouraged or prevented.

ALLOW COMPETITION AMONG ALL RESOURCES IN SPOT MARKETS

Each region currently has many generation types owned by many entities including utilities and independent power producers. Low-cost decarbonization can be best achieved if all of these resources participate in active competition on a day-to-day basis. The “economic dispatch” from traditional utility operations was modified to “bid-based” dispatch as electricity markets were introduced beginning 25 years ago in the Northeast, Texas, and California. Now bid-based, RTO-operated spot markets also exist in MISO and SPP and serve about two-thirds of the nation’s electricity demand. For low-cost decarbonization, such spot markets will be needed in the other one-third of the country, including the interior West, Northwest, and Southeast.

In some of these RTOs, uneconomic “self-scheduling” of old units still frequently occurs, where a utility can choose to keep dispatching certain generators for their financial viability even if they are not economic.⁹⁷ Full competitive market participation by all resources should be encouraged by state and federal policy makers.

UTILIZE HOURLY ENERGY PRODUCTS AND PRICES TO MEET LOAD IN ALL HOURS

Power production and consumption need to always be in balance. Technically electric energy in each hour has always been a distinct “product,” because limited storage means energy produced in one hour cannot be substituted for energy in a different hour. The general RTO market design developed two decades ago does provide for hourly prices to vary based on hourly supply and demand. That system will generally work well in the future since it is flexible and allows prices to change as scarcity occurs at different times.

Price patterns will likely look very different with the future portfolio. Prices used to tend to be high in the afternoon, particularly in summer-peaking systems on summer days. But in the future there will likely be very high solar output in the afternoon, leading to lower hourly prices. The scarcity period is already shifting to evenings in California and Texas, after solar output drops. Hourly markets will need to address the scarcity periods that can occur at unexpected times of the season and year due to the interaction of weather and load, and the periods that last three or more days where shortages occur, often in the winter with high electric heating load, limited solar energy, and occasional periods of little wind.

⁹⁴ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, **Order No. 2000**, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285.

⁹⁵ Intra-RTO rate pancaking is barred by FERC Order No. 2000. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, **Order No. 2000**, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285.

⁹⁶ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, **Order Conditionally Accepting Proposed Tariff Revisions to Implement Energy Imbalance Market**, 147 FERC ¶ 61,231, Par 156.

⁹⁷ Daniel, “The Coal Bailout Nobody Is Talking About.”

EMPLOY VALUE-BASED PRICING TO ATTRACT AND RETAIN FLEXIBLE RESOURCES

Price signals that compensate supply during periods of scarcity on daily operational time scales are needed to ensure adequate supply of flexible resources.⁹⁸ Moment-to-moment and hour-to-hour, flexible resources such as battery energy storage and many forms of demand response will need price signals to consume and produce at precisely the right time to meet system needs. Wholesale energy prices are presently based on the marginal cost of generation, which corresponds with fuel costs and generator availability. Since renewable resources, storage, and demand response generate power without fuel inputs, and therefore have a marginal cost of zero, relying on fuel cost to set prices will fail to attract flexible resources or imports from neighboring regions when the power is needed. The basis of wholesale energy prices will need to shift to the scarcity value of power to efficiently signal demand for flexibility from these resources.

Scarcity-based pricing is consistent with economic theory and compatible with the incentives of all resources including the new energy-limited energy storage resources. Resources that do not use fuel inputs and thus have zero marginal cost of supply are likely to run at or near maximal output regularly. As overall demand reaches a maximum supply constraint at any given time, standard economics teaches that prices are set by consumers' willingness to pay rather than suppliers' willingness to offer (i.e., intersection of the demand curve with the vertical supply curve). In future power system operations, that

consumer willingness to pay should be reflected by actual consumer demand-side bids. Unless and until actual demand side bidding begins, administrative proxies for demand bids can be used, called "value of lost load."⁹⁹ Scarcity pricing based on the value of lost load will attract flexible resources where and when they are needed while minimizing their under- or over-procurement. Technically, the mechanics take place as an adder to the energy price based on an Operating Reserves Demand Curve (ORDC) up to an administratively set overall maximum.

In addition to scarcity-based pricing, removing offer floors will support a clearer signal of the value of avoiding generator curtailment during periods of oversupply. Negative prices do happen for legitimate reasons in markets, and sometimes are needed to efficiently determine which units should curtail. This form of value-based pricing can incent the charging of grid energy storage and/or ramping up customers' electric vehicle charging and other discretionary loads.

Accurate value-based energy prices will also serve the important function of encouraging long-term hedging and flexible resource procurement, as discussed in the next chapter on procurement.¹⁰⁰

Large and small electricity customers will need the ability to hedge against high prices in the future power system. In a well-functioning market, almost no one actually pays a scarcity-based price who doesn't intentionally plan on occasionally doing so and is fully informed about the risks. The price can be thought of as a speeding ticket for those who choose

⁹⁸ FTI Consulting, "Resource Adequacy Mechanisms in the National Electricity Market."

⁹⁹ See Sullivan, Schellenberg, and Blundell, "Updated Value of Service Reliability Estimates for Electric Utility Customers in the United States." See also a review of Value of Lost Load (VOLL) levels and derivation methods in London Economics International, "Estimating the Value of Lost Load," and in Kuckshinrichs and Schröder, "Value of Lost Load."

¹⁰⁰ Pérez-Arriaga et al., "Adapting Market Design to High Shares of Variable Renewable Energy."

to take the risk. Consumer protection and benefit will depend on well-functioning economic hedging, either performed by the customer itself or by a regulated entity on their behalf, as determined and regulated by states, as discussed in Chapter 5. In addition, a “circuit breaker” is likely needed to protect consumers and avoid financial disruption in case the system reaches an excessive number of hours at elevated prices. Australia has a circuit breaker system in place which could be a model.¹⁰¹

IMPLEMENT FAST SCHEDULING AND DISPATCH TO ENABLE FLEXIBILITY

Another critical element needed for system operations to reliably handle a clean energy portfolio will be aligning price signals with the physical system via higher frequency real-time scheduling and dispatch. A system with high shares of renewables will more likely experience short-run supply fluctuations of significant magnitude, which may result from forecasting errors. Increasing the granularity of system operations—i.e., dispatch intervals of less than five minutes, with scheduling lead times of less than 10 minutes—¹⁰² will better match those fluctuations. By reducing the possibility of significant deviations between supply and demand in a given operating period, fast scheduling and dispatch can reduce uncertainty in net load. Doing so will allow higher reliance on market dispatch governed by price signals to

follow changes in net load, avoiding more costly ancillary services like frequency regulation and ramping services as well as reducing the use of short-run curtailment.¹⁰³

NON-DISCRIMINATORY OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY SERVICES FOR SYSTEM BALANCING

Reliable operation of the clean energy fleet will rely on a set of technology-neutral flexibility services. Maintaining electric system stability requires supply to equal demand at all moments, even when generator outages occur suddenly or forecasts of load or renewable output deviate significantly from actual operations. NERC has identified a set of short-term essential reliability services, which fall into the categories of frequency response, ramping and balancing, and support and are¹⁰⁴ necessary for maintaining grid stability in sub-seconds to hours timeframes. These include traditional frequency regulation and synchronous and non-synchronous reserves though the nomenclature and exact definitions vary by region and have been changing over time.

For a supply mix consisting primarily of inverter-based wind, solar, and storage resources, “flexible reserves” may need to become a more explicit and well-defined set of products to allow system operators to achieve system balancing in different time scales,¹⁰⁵ from sub-second to seconds to minutes to hours to days or even

¹⁰¹ AEMO, Operation of the administered price provisions in the National Electricity Market, p. 4, July 2019. See also WattClarity, Cumulative Price, and the Cumulative Price Threshold.

¹⁰² Order 825 required all RTOs/ISOs to align dispatch and settlement intervals to ensure scarcity pricing can be effectively triggered. Real-time energy and operating reserves must use a five-minute interval, such that scarcity pricing may be triggered in any five-minute interval. Additionally, all markets use a 10-minute scheduling lead time for spinning reserves. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, **Order No. 825**, 155 FERC ¶ 61,276.

¹⁰³ Moving to shorter duration intervals has reduced reliance on reserves, such as was experienced in BPA’s shift to 10-min scheduling intervals, and reduced curtailments, such as was experienced in ERCOT’s shift to 5-min dispatch intervals—see Bird, Cochran, and Wang, “**Wind and Solar Energy Curtailment**.” See also Milligan et al., “**Examination of Potential Benefits of an Energy Imbalance Market in the Western Interconnection**,” and U.S. Department of Energy, “**Wind Vision: A New Era for Wind Power in the United States**,” Ch. 2.

¹⁰⁴ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “**Essential Reliability Services Whitepaper on Sufficiency Guidelines**.”

¹⁰⁵ Electric Power Research Institute, “**Ancillary Services in the United States: Technical Requirements, Market Designs and Price Trends**.”

seasons ahead of real time. For the system to operate reliably, the services will need to be defined based on engineering needs as they evolve over time on each particular system, and then procured by any resource capable of providing them.¹⁰⁶ A large set of research has been devoted to the need for flexible resources in clean energy systems and ways to attract and retain flexibility in power markets,¹⁰⁷ most of which can be provided by wind, solar, and storage themselves.¹⁰⁸

The definitions of what triggers the use of each flexibility reserve product will evolve to reflect future needs. For example, “duck curve” situations will start occurring in regions beyond California as solar energy grows, regularly presenting steep increases in net load at the end of the day when solar output declines. Current “spinning” and “non-spinning” reserves not only have names that are based on conventional generator characteristics, but they are usually designed to be triggered by a forced outage of a conventional generator or transmission line, not for rapid changes in renewable generation output and the resultant ramps across seconds to hours. It may be economic to adapt existing contingency reserves for abrupt wind or solar shortfalls.¹⁰⁹

Similarly, the future system will need to attract frequency support. A system consisting primarily of inverter-based wind, solar, and

storage resources will have less inertia from conventional generation units, which have traditionally provided a slow-moving stabilizing response to deviations in grid frequency caused by sudden tripping of generators or loads. Fast frequency response—within fractions of a second—can replace the need for slower-response primary frequency response service, which typically occurs in sub-minute timescale while reducing the overall frequency response service needed.¹¹⁰ Additionally, primary frequency response lacks appropriate service definitions for resources like storage, which do not have the minimum generation constraints or headroom requirements of fueled generators. Since storage, demand response, and renewables will provide fast frequency response but face a greater duty cycle for doing so, frequency response should be procured via market mechanisms as one of the short-run flexibility services.¹¹¹

To attract the flexibility to balance against system variability, flexibility will need to be financially rewarded. The flexible resources of the clean energy portfolio will be both faster-responding and more precise than conventional generation. Efficiently utilizing flexible resources may require the introduction of pay-for-performance measures to reward fast and accurate response, such as FERC’s requirements for frequency regulation compensation in Order 755.¹¹²

¹⁰⁶ Orvis and Aggarwal, “A Roadmap for Finding Flexibility in Wholesale Markets: Best Practices for Market Design and Operations in a High Renewables Future,” ix.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, Orvis and Aggarwal, “A Roadmap for Finding Flexibility in Wholesale Markets: Best Practices for Market Design and Operations in a High Renewables Future,” Glazer et al., “The Future of Centrally Organized Wholesale Markets,” Nolan et al., “Synergies between Wind and Solar Generation and Demand Response,” Mays, “Missing Incentives for Flexibility in Wholesale Electricity Markets,” and Linvill et al., “Flexibility for the 21st Century Power System.”

¹⁰⁸ Milligan, “Sources of Grid Reliability Services.”

¹⁰⁹ GE Energy, “Western Wind and Solar Integration Study: Executive Summary.”

¹¹⁰ See Newell et al., “Cost-Benefit Analysis of ERCOT’s Future Ancillary Services (FAS) Proposal,”

¹¹¹ ERCOT’s Responsive Reserve Market procures Fast Frequency Response service in two separate tranches, in addition to Primary Frequency Response service—see ERCOT, “NPRR863.” Also see, Ela et al., “Market Designs for the Primary Frequency Response Ancillary Service—Part I: Motivation and Design.”

¹¹² Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064.

To attract the flexibility to balance against system variability, current accommodations for inflexibility will also need to be removed. System operations can remove accommodations for the costs imposed by inflexible resources, such as fossil units with limitations on start-up times and ramp rates. Current short-term reliability service requirements that accommodate inflexibility, such as the 10-30 minutes of lead time for contingency reserves and the many seconds of lead time of primary frequency response, should be removed. Complemented by fast scheduling and dispatch, removal of such accommodations will ensure flexibility services are defined in a performance-based and technology-neutral manner.

Technology-neutral operational reliability services will also have the benefit of enabling wind and solar resources to provide them, since they can be dispatched down quickly¹¹³ or, when curtailed, can be dispatched up quickly.¹¹⁴ While the opportunity cost of curtailing zero marginal cost renewable output typically makes this source of flexibility uneconomic today, this capability will increasingly be utilized as wind and solar penetrations grow, curtailment levels increase, and fewer flexible conventional generators are available.¹¹⁵

Energy markets and reliability services markets that are co-optimized will result in more

efficient dispatch outcomes that indicate the relative value and opportunity cost for a resource to provide energy versus flexibility services. Any given resource might be better suited to providing a flexibility service as opposed to energy at a given time so there needs to be a way to efficiently “sort” resources into their appropriate product. Real-time co-optimization of the energy markets with those services is the best way to do that, using the offers and operational constraint information provided by potential suppliers.¹¹⁶ Market rules will enable resources to switch between providing energy and flexibility services sub-hourly, enabling more efficient use of fast-responding renewable and storage resources capable of providing various services.¹¹⁷

Non-discriminatory service definitions and eligibility will facilitate entry of new technologies and innovations in the future. Over the period of system decarbonization, new technologies will almost certainly develop, both within resource types and in new resource types. Non-discriminatory service definitions provide an opportunity for new technologies to compete on a level playing field.

Some operational reliability services are conducive to competitive procurement while others are characterized by local monopoly supply and thus better suited to cost-based regulation and service requirements. Reactive

¹¹³ Goggin et al., “Customer Focused and Clean: Power Markets for the Future.”

¹¹⁴ Ela et al., “Active Power Controls from Wind Power: Bridging the Gaps,” and Loutan et al., “Demonstration of Essential Reliability Services by a 300-MW Solar Photovoltaic Power Plant.”

¹¹⁵ Energy and Environmental Economics, “Investigating the Economic Value of Flexible Solar Power Plant Operation.”

¹¹⁶ Reedy, “Simulation of Real-Time Co-Optimization of Energy and Ancillary Services for Operating Year 2017.”

¹¹⁷ Goggin et al., “Customer Focused and Clean: Power Markets for the Future.”

power and voltage control is a physical service that does not travel long distances. It is needed in narrow geographic markets and can be provided often only by a generator at that location. FERC and RTOs have standard formulas for reactive power compensation, though like all services there are disputes about what is fair compensation. Recently, FERC acted to require reactive power provision by all newly interconnecting non-synchronous generators (including wind, storage, and batteries).¹¹⁸

Distinct engineering needs should define the services. Different types of resources that can provide the same reliability service should be grouped together and compete to provide the service to the customer, as in traditional economic product definition.¹¹⁹ In the case of operational reliability services, the grid operator is essentially acting as the customer, representing their desire for reliability.

Large electricity customers will have greater options for clean energy procurement if reliability services are procured on a technology-neutral basis. When a customer contracts with a new renewable resource, for example, that resource may be able to sell for a lower energy price if it is also able to earn money in reliability services markets. And for renewables and storage resources overall, they can enter markets to a greater extent if they are given equal opportunities with fossil resources in reliability services markets.

INTEGRATE DERS, INCLUDING DISPATCHABLE DEMAND, TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY

System operations will incorporate Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). FERC Order 2222 established pathways for DER aggregations greater than 100 kW in size to participate directly in wholesale markets, which followed from FERC Order 841 establishing the same for individual distributed energy storage systems and from FERC Order 719 enabling demand response resource participation. Operational infrastructure should allow DERs to contribute to system supply and reliability, with an appropriate level of visibility for system operators.¹²⁰ Such a framework would maximize efficient operations by relying on storage, hybrid resources, and DER aggregations to self-optimize to meet performance obligations and respond to price signals, in addition to relying on direct control by system operators under certain circumstances.

DER integration should be feasible without increasing computational complexity beyond available computing power. Computing power may become less of a constraint with continuing hardware and software improvements as market designs evolve to reduce geographic or temporal complexity,¹²¹ and as systems rely less on inflexible resources with significant start-up costs or lead times that require complicated optimization algorithms.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, **Order No. 827**, 155 FERC ¶ 61,277.

¹¹⁹ A relevant market in anti-trust law is “composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced.” See **United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.**, 351 U.S. 377.

¹²⁰ “Development of an operational infrastructure that provides visibility and control (direct or indirect) of distributed resources such as DR and PEVs,” See North American Electric Reliability Corporation, **“Integration of Variable Generation Task Force: Summary and Recommendations of 12 Tasks,”** xv.

¹²¹ Campos do Prado et al., **“The Next-Generation Retail Electricity Market in the Context of Distributed Energy Resources: Vision and Integrating Framework,”** and Cornejo and Sioshansi, **“Rethinking Restructured Electricity Market Design: Lessons Learned and Future Needs.”**

¹²² A review of the literature on computational complexity of optimization of commitment of inflexible units can be found in Sheble and Fahd, **“Unit Commitment Literature Synopsis.”**

DER integration will necessarily be complemented via coordination with distribution system operators and retail authorities, to whom it falls to update interconnection and other features of local system operation to facilitate DER support of the bulk power system. Indeed, the interface between bulk system operators and distribution system operators will fundamentally structure the extent to which DERs enhance or constrain overall system operation.¹²³ Real-time pricing or some version of time-of-use pricing that provides more incentives for consumers to shift consumption would likely have a large impact on the amount of firm supply needed.¹²⁴ A number of other performance approaches are being developed for use by state retail service regulators to encourage responsiveness of demand to system needs.¹²⁵

As noted above, with DER growth system operations will increasingly call on dispatchable demand instead of supply, ideally with scarcity price signals communicated directly to loads. A system with high shares of variable renewable energy generation, where weather may limit dispatchability, will rely increasingly on the dispatchability of demand.¹²⁶ The incorporation of all DERs more generally will have the added benefit of enabling more operational use of load flexibility, whether for individual customers or for aggregations of customers. To that end, the barriers to market participation of

dispatchable demand built into FERC Order 719 and Order 2222 will need to be removed.

A large set of loads that are dispatchable as a regular part of market operations, and not simply as emergency resources, will significantly reduce requirements to procure firm capacity and flexibility to ensure resource adequacy.¹²⁷ Dispatchable loads will be available on a variety of timescales and may be designed to include load consumption and bi-directional products, in addition to traditional demand reduction.¹²⁸ This will become particularly important as transportation and other sectors of the economy electrify and present a new set of loads that can be utilized flexibly and in concert with renewable generation. Existing and newly electrified demand resources will be price-responsive, either directly to prices in wholesale markets or indirectly via retail rate structures that proxy for real-time price signals.¹²⁹ Not only does this provide significant value to the power system by reducing peak demand and shifting consumption to periods with lower energy cost¹³⁰ but also it aligns demand with renewable energy production and reduces the need for curtailment, since real-time energy costs are lowest when zero marginal cost wind and solar resources are abundant.¹³¹ As a result, dispatchable demand will also help sustain a higher value for renewable output at higher shares of overall generation.¹³²

¹²³ Kristov, De Martini, and Taft, "A Tale of Two Visions: Designing a Decentralized Transactive Electric System," and Kristov, "Modernizing Transmission-Distribution Interface Coordination for a High-DER Future."

¹²⁴ Faruqui and Bourbonnais, "The Tariffs of Tomorrow: Innovations in Rate Designs."

¹²⁵ Gold et al., "Performance Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Demand Reduction."

¹²⁶ Milligan and Kirby, "Utilizing Load Response for Wind and Solar Integration and Power System Reliability," and Cochran et al. "Flexibility in 21st Century Power Systems."

¹²⁷ See Alstone et al., "Final Report on Phase 2 Results: 2025 California Demand Response Potential Study," Hale, Stoll, and Mai, "Capturing the Impact of Storage and Other Flexible Technologies on Electric System Planning," and Hurley, Peterson, and Whited, "Demand Response as a Power System Resource: Program Designs, Performance, and Lessons Learned in the United States."

¹²⁸ See California Public Utilities Commission's Working Group on Load Shift, "Final Report of the California Public Utilities Commission's Working Group on Load Shift."

¹²⁹ Badtke-Berkow et al., "A Primer On Time-Variant Electricity Pricing."

¹³⁰ Borenstein, "The Long-Run Efficiency of Real-Time Electricity Pricing."

¹³¹ Mills and Wiser, "Strategies for Mitigating the Reduction in Economic Value of Variable Generation with Increasing Penetration Levels."

¹³² Goldenburg, Dyson, and Masters, "Demand Flexibility: The Key to Enabling a Low-Cost, Low-Carbon Grid."


Large electricity customers will have greater options for clean energy procurement if their own loads and onsite DERs are able to bid. The dual use of such resources for meeting facility functions, moreover, can lower the overall price of service provision and provides a hedge on the value of future clean energy output.

ADDRESS UNCERTAINTY THROUGH FORECASTING, UNIT COMMITMENT, AND FORWARD PROCUREMENT

Variability itself is less of a challenge for operators than uncertainty of output. When operators know what is going to happen, as long as they have enough flexible resources responding to their dispatch signal, they can ramp the fleet up or down to keep it in

balance, as they do all day every day. Wind and solar forecasting are relatively new fields of science and engineering that have advanced dramatically and still can be both improved and better integrated into system operations. Importantly, there are knowable conditions when forecasts can be less accurate than normal times, such as the exact timing of a weather front moving across a system. When a lot of resources are impacted by the same condition, such as gas plant de-rates in a heat wave, or wind output in a front, that is when the overall impact on system balance can be a concern. Operators should incorporate probability distributions to a greater extent, and not rely so much on the deterministic point estimate of load or renewable output.

FIGURE 16
Dispatchable Demand on Varying Timescales¹³³



¹³³ Alstone et al., "Final Report on Phase 2 Results: 2025 California Demand Response Potential Study."

In the hours and days ahead of real time operations, operators may need more assurance of physical unit availability and market participants may need more information about system needs to give them time to respond.¹³⁴ The commitment of generating units on a day-to-day basis will need to consider the uncertainty of wind and solar resources, and to a lesser extent the energy limits of resources like storage and demand response. Electricity spot markets have generally included both day-ahead and real-time time frames, to manage risks and uncertainties. This is called a *multi-settlement* system where resources financially and physically lock in ahead of time, then re-settle deviations from the first settlement in real time. There may be benefit to additional settlement periods such as days ahead of time, or multiple settlements within the operating day. The choice of settlement time frames should consider whether there are sufficient resources that can respond in minutes, hours, or days rather than just the traditional day ahead decision making built into operating systems based on the characteristics of fossil units.

As penetrations of storage and demand response increase, the market price of flexibility services in many time intervals is likely to be low, punctuated by periods of very high prices when these services are needed and their supply is scarce. Therefore, short-run forward procurement may be required to ensure sufficient flexibility services days or weeks ahead of real time to provide assurance of supply.¹³⁵ This in turn may require forecasts of



between days and months ahead of real-time to set flexibility reserve levels for procurement.

Probabilistic unit commitment processes can better accommodate renewable forecast uncertainty and minimize the cost, emissions, and inflexibility introduced by over-committing long lead-time resources.¹³⁶ DER aggregations should either be exempted from unit commitment if small in size or else have probabilistic commitment for the entire aggregation, rather than commitment parameters for each unit, which will reduce computational complexity without compromising visibility or control.¹³⁷

Large electricity customers may receive direct benefit from better access for DERs. Their own demand may be flexible and can serve as a resource that can be sold to reduce their overall cost of energy services for customers. Even if their load does not participate, the active involvement of customer' demand and other distributed resources can lower overall electricity costs and increase reliability in a power system.

¹³⁴ Midcontinent Independent System Operator, "Exploration of a Forward Market Mechanism."

¹³⁵ Hogan and Gottstein, "What Lies 'Beyond Capacity Markets'? Delivering Least-Cost Reliability Under the New Resource Paradigm."

¹³⁶ Ela, "Advanced Unit Commitment With High Penetrations of Variable Generation." See also Ela et al., "Advanced Unit Commitment Strategies for the U.S. Eastern Interconnection."

¹³⁷ For example, NYISO will not apply commitment parameters to DER aggregations; see Lavillotti, "DER Energy Market Design: Part 1." FERC Order No. 2222 specifies that larger, multi-nodal DER aggregations may use distribution factors rather than individual unit supply, which EPRI explained in its comments—see Electric Power Research Institute, **Post-Technical Conference Comments on participation of distributed energy resource (DER) aggregations in Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operator Markets—Comments on Panels 1, 6, and 7.**

OPTIMIZE ENERGY-LIMITED RESOURCES IN MARKET DESIGN

In order to integrate the significant amounts of energy storage and demand response needed to manage the mismatch between the timing of output and consumption at intervals of minutes and hours, power systems will need to optimize the output from energy-limited resources. With energy-limited resources such as batteries, resource availability in subsequent time intervals changes based on dispatch decisions in the current interval. Optimizing energy limited resource output is a constraint into system operations that is generally not yet taken into account. As energy-limited resources become large sources of flexibility, power system planners must increasingly account for chronological dispatch patterns, bridging the traditional siloes between power system planning and operations.¹³⁸

Large electricity customers may own or contract for energy-limited resources, as many are pursuing now with battery energy storage. They may wish to optimize their own resource, making their own judgments about when to charge and discharge based on their own consumption and market prices. While self-optimization should remain a right of asset owners, customers may also prefer to voluntarily allow the central spot market operator to optimize the units, in which case this RTO capability will need to be developed in software upgrades that can better incorporate state of charge information.

ENABLE BROADER PARTICIPATION THROUGH HIERARCHICAL CONTROL

System operators will need to rely less on direct dispatch control and more on price signals and probabilistic estimation of load and generation. DER owners will have private considerations on their willingness to produce, which only they can optimize. Electric vehicles interact with the electric grid as a means to support transportation demands that are sometimes insensitive to system conditions,¹³⁹ and behind-the-meter solar and storage systems may face local constraints or be used by customers for their own resilience instead of contributing to the larger grid as a resource.¹⁴⁰ System operator visibility into DERs, both individually and in aggregations, is likely to be limited or, at best, uneven. Energy storage operators will maintain the option to self-manage state of charge for availability, with near-instant response times, reducing the usefulness of unit commitment, particularly with effective scarcity price formation.

Whether due to computational complexity or regulatory constraints to requirements placed on market participants, there will need to be much more reliance on self-optimization by market participants. Self-optimization requires performance-based product definitions with effective price formation and disincentives for deviation or non-performance to ensure market discipline.¹⁴¹ In this future, market participants should have the option to choose

¹³⁸ Models using representative days instead of hourly chronological will miss longer duration storage value. For example, see Childs et al., “**Long Duration Energy Storage for California’s Clean, Reliable Grid.**”

¹³⁹ Bedir et al., “**California Plug-In Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Projections: 2017-2025.**”

¹⁴⁰ For general barriers to grid support from behind-the-meter solar and storage systems, see for example Murtishaw, “**Barriers to Maximizing the Value of Behind-the-Meter Distributed Energy Resources.**” Resilience operations may also lead to BTM storage systems defaulting to maintain high state of charge during grid emergencies, such as reported by Ed Burgess at Burgess, Ed. *Twitter*.

¹⁴¹ Gramlich, Goggin, and Burwen, “**Enabling Versatility: Allowing Hybrid Resources to Deliver Their Full Value to Customers,**” and Ahlstrom et al., “**Hybrid Power Plants –Flexible Resources to Simplify Markets and Support Grid Operations.**”

between accepting direct control by the grid operator or self-optimization, each of which will present different costs and benefits. Market participants can then optimize among a fuller set of operational choices in response to price signals, improving price formation and market efficiency, while still giving the RTO the option to pursue reliability assurances via different

incentives for direct control. At the same time, RTOs presently predict load-to-base decisions about procurement and operations to maintain reliability, even without any control and limited visibility; future grid operators will need to do this on the supply side as well, via more accurate and precise forecasting of renewables output.



MONITOR AND MITIGATE MARKET POWER TO PROTECT CONSUMERS WITHOUT DISTORTING EFFICIENT BEHAVIOR

Electricity markets typically have market monitors and behavioral rules in place to protect against the exercise of generation market power. Unless and until there is a large amount of price-responsive demand and large regional markets with robust transmission infrastructure, the structural conditions are likely to occasionally exist for “pivotal suppliers” to be able to bid any level and be chosen in the dispatch. This sets prices for all load, unless some rules are in place to prevent that outcome.¹⁴² Typically market power mitigation rules apply to the bids of individual generators, depending on the company and unit structural position at different times.

In the future, as energy-limited resources enter power markets, market power mitigation will need to shift to an opportunity-cost basis to ensure wholesale prices are just and reasonable. Flexible, energy-limited resources are likely to serve as the marginal clearing unit for system balancing in the future clean energy portfolio. However, the traditional approach of limiting bid inflation applied to fossil-fueled generators that may exercise market power—namely, by quantifying their variable costs—does not apply well to energy-limited resources that have low

and complex variable costs;¹⁴³ doing so will result in over-mitigation of such resources’ energy bids and defeat effective procurement of flexibility. For resources like owners of energy storage that are deemed to have market power, optimal market bidding behavior will be based on a forecast of prices for various services in future periods. As such, the basis of bid mitigation will need to shift to quantifying opportunity costs, developing methods to bound the uncertainty inherent in forecasting future prices.¹⁴⁴

Ultimately, the best method to mitigate market power is likely to be much greater competition. The incorporation of demand and other DERs into wholesale markets can reduce the market power of larger resources due to transmission constraints or other geographically localized phenomena. Regulators should also prevent consolidation of generation ownership, and support transmission expansion to geographically broaden markets and increase competition.

Large electricity customers can protect themselves to some extent by hedging in advance to lock in supply commitments so that they do not have to pay high prices in real time. But when a supplier is a pivotal resource in a transmission-constrained area, there is little customers can do on their own, so it is a matter for public policy.

¹⁴² Wolak, “Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market, 1998-2000,” and Gramlich, “The Role of Regulation in Addressing Generation Market Power.”

¹⁴³ For example, the cycling of batteries causes degradation over time, reducing overall charging capability and eventually requiring cell replacement. While not directly incurred during operations as fuel consumption might, such cycling costs could be considered a variable cost component when making economic decisions with storage.

¹⁴⁴ For example, see the discussion of Default Energy Bids for storage in Carr et al., “Energy Storage and Distributed Energy Resources Phase 4: Final Proposal.”

SEEK COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL ATTRIBUTES AND SYSTEM OPERATION

The emissions characteristics of different resources are valued by customers separately from the energy they provide to power homes and businesses. Providing multiple products and services from a given resource is not a new economic idea; for example, coal plants sell coal ash and biomass plants sell waste management services to earn revenues outside of the electricity system. But environmental attributes are becoming a bigger part of the overall electricity system value stream, and there are interactions in both directions between environmental attributes and power system operation that can affect the total costs to electricity customers.

Environmental attributes have mostly been bought and sold in the form of Renewable Energy Credits (REC) to date.¹⁴⁵ RECs may be purchased by customers acting on their own (i.e., voluntary RECs) and load-serving entities may purchase “compliance RECs” to satisfy their obligations under state Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). Thirty states plus Washington, D.C. have a mandatory RPS in place.¹⁴⁶ Increasingly these states and federal policy makers are considering “Clean Energy Standards” (CES) with “Clean Energy Attribute Credits” (CEACs)¹⁴⁷ which would allow participation of more carbon-free sources such as fossil units with carbon capture. RECs and CEACs are measured in

energy terms, as megawatt-hours of energy produced by eligible resources. Eligibility for what is “renewable” is defined by states (for compliance RECs) or by consumers and certification entities (for voluntary RECs).¹⁴⁸ Geographic eligibility is often based on being produced in the RTO or deliverable to the RTO of a given state or consumer.¹⁴⁹

It will be important for low-cost decarbonization to synchronize CEACs and electricity markets. Such synchronization was not so important in the past when RPS requirements were in the range of 5 to 20 percent of total energy. Then, the product could simply be based on a MWh of renewable energy from anywhere in the same region of a given state, produce at any time of day or year. As CES’ grow to 35, 50, or 75 percent or more of energy, the CEAC definitions and prices will have a significant influence on the time and locations of development and operation that are encouraged by the programs, which will impact cost and reliability. Significant work is underway to have time-stamped RECs (TRECs).¹⁵⁰

CEAC definitions can also impact environmental quality. For example, RECs to serve Eastern PJM states are now coming from as far away as North Dakota, due to the large resource base and low cost.¹⁵¹ Four states plus Washington, D.C. in PJM all procured less than 50 percent of their RECs from in-state resources through 2017.¹⁵² Remote resources can physically serve load and displace dirty local resources if there

¹⁴⁵ See Brattle Group and REBA Institute, “Renewable Energy Policy Pathways Report.”

¹⁴⁶ Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, “Renewable & Clean Energy Standards.”

¹⁴⁷ Spees et al., “How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals Through a Forward Market for Clean Energy Attributes.”

¹⁴⁸ RPS types are described well in LBNL’s annual surveys, see Barbose, “U.S. Renewables Portfolio Standards.”

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Thoubboron, “New Jersey TRECs.”

¹⁵¹ Porter, Hoyt, and Widiss, “Final Report Concerning the Maryland Renewable Portfolio Standard as Required by Chapter 393 of the Acts of the Maryland General Assembly of 2017,” Figure 2-69.

¹⁵² Ibid., Figure ES-11.

are no transmission constraints, but not otherwise. In a study of Maryland moving from a 25 percent to 50 percent RPS, the Maryland Department of Natural Resources found “CO₂ emissions from electric power plants located in Maryland are relatively unchanged because coal and natural gas plants in Maryland continue to generate power for sale into PJM’s wholesale markets...NO_x and SO₂ emissions from in-state generation are also relatively unchanged, for the same reasons.”¹⁵³ CEACs with physical delivery requirements may allow more emissions to be displaced rather than having all clean sources amass in certain areas while other areas preserve their existing generation mix.

By the same token, electricity markets should fully respect environmental attribute products. States and consumers tend to have preferences for certain environmental attributes or location over others. States can be expected to make value judgments in the future about which resources to count. The framework of buckets used in California, with more demand resulting in higher prices for higher-valued resources may become a common way for states to differentiate and spur desired resource development.¹⁵⁴ Similarly, individual electricity customers—commercial, industrial, and residential--can make their own choices about specific products, and they may differentiate environmental attributes into buckets. The FERC and ISO/RTO minimum offer price rule (MOPR) is a glaring example of electricity market rules interfering with state policy, undermining the value states intended to provide to desired resources.¹⁵⁵

MOPR can raise costs to consumers by billions of dollars per year in a single region.¹⁵⁶ A better framework for electricity market design is to fully compensate resources for whatever energy or reliability services they provide, regardless of what other products they sell or incentives they receive.

PROMOTE RTO GOVERNANCE REFORMS TO INCLUDE EQUAL CONSUMER PARTICIPATION

RTO governance was originally designed for RTOs whose functions involved transmission service, spot market operation, and transmission planning. As RTOs have become more involved in resource procurement such as mandatory capacity markets (discussed in Chapter 5), and given their impact on the determinations of scarcity pricing and market power mitigation, it is important for their governance to reflect a balance between buyer and seller interest. This is particularly important if FERC chooses to continue deferring to RTO stakeholder judgment. Relying on industry groups such as standards making bodies to decide on operational details such as the time of bid submissions can be beneficial, but it is a matter of public policy when deciding how much procurement should take place for reliability, or what is an allowable bid from a generator with market power. RTO governance will likely need reform to neutrally administer their responsibilities.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Ibid., Figure 2-26.

¹⁵⁴ California Public Utilities Commission, “33% RPS Procurement Rules.”

¹⁵⁵ Kathryn Cleary, “What the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) Means for Clean Energy in PJM,” Patel, “The Significance of FERC’s Recent PJM MOPR Order Explained,” Goggin and Gramlich, “A Moving Target: An Update on the Consumer Impacts of FERC Interference with State Policies in the PJM Region.”

¹⁵⁶ Goggin and Gramlich, “A Moving Target: An Update on the Consumer Impacts of FERC Interference with State Policies in the PJM Region.”

¹⁵⁷ See Konschnik, “RTOGov: Exploring Links Between Market Decision-Making Processes and Outcomes.”

PROMOTE MARKETS THAT ENABLE AND SUPPORT BILATERAL TRANSACTIONS

In many industries, spot markets and longer-term bilateral transactions co-exist and serve as mutually complementary. Typically most trading of volume and money occurs in bilateral transactions. These can be either financial contracts tied to spot market prices, or physical forward contracts. Having access to these contracts is important for the health of any industry, and electricity is no exception. Electricity customers have many long-term contracts in place and will likely continue arranging such deals to serve their evolving needs, as discussed in Chapter 5. Spot markets should enable and support such contracts. Interventions such as FERC's Minimum Offer Price Rule that make bilateral clean energy purchases more expensive should be avoided.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS

- FERC should consider making RTOs mandatory or revoking market advantages to utilities that have not voluntarily joined RTOs. Moving large amounts of power within and across regions will require large RTOs in all regions.
- Generators should all compete in hour-to-hour and day-to-day markets.
- Large electricity customers should seek appropriately balanced RTO governance given the impacts on RTO policy decisions on market outcomes. FERC should undertake review and reform of RTO governance.



RTO market design should incorporate best practices as described above, including:

- Utilizing of fast scheduling and dispatch to enable system flexibility
- Implementing of scarcity-based pricing to attract and retain flexible resources, while supporting long-term contracting and hedging so that consumers that plan in advance do not pay these prices, and a circuit-breaker mechanism to avoid excessive impact on consumers
- Monitoring of the market and mitigation to prevent the exercise of market power while allowing the energy-limited resources to bid their legitimate opportunity costs
- Establishing of a set of non-discriminatory operations reliability services to ensure reliability
- Enabling and supporting bilateral contracting
- Integrating of DERs, with emphasis on dispatchable demand, to increase system efficiency
- Undertaking forecasting, unit commitment, and multi-settlement systems to better incorporate near- and medium-term uncertainty
- Optimizing energy-limited resources
- Hierarchical control to allow market participants to self-optimize
- Compatible environmental attribute and electricity market products

CHAPTER 5:

21ST CENTURY MARKET STRUCTURE AND RESOURCE PROCUREMENT

Electric industry institutions were built around the operations and planning processes that made sense for the 20th century fleet of resources, as described in Chapter 2. The 21st century fleet and how its characteristics differ from the 20th century fleet was described in Chapter 3. Short-term operation of the 21st century fleet, or the conducting of the orchestra, was discussed in Chapter 4. In this chapter we turn to long-term resource procurement--how to assemble members of the orchestra and make sure every part can be played.

The importance of the resource procurement was already a key structural concern of electricity policymakers before the clean energy transition. It was often not thought through during electricity restructuring. When California discouraged long-term contracting in its initial

attempt at electricity markets, that was a major contributor to the Western energy crisis of 2000-2001.¹⁵⁸

Well-functioning procurement will be critical to achieve the massive amount of generation investment needed. By one estimate we will need 1,100 GW by 2035, or 70 GW per year of new renewables and storage.¹⁵⁹ Well-functioning procurement is particularly important and challenging for the 21st century electricity portfolio because a majority of the energy is likely to come from zero marginal wind and solar resources. High penetration of zero marginal cost resources will tend to reduce spot energy prices and the revenues sellers earn from energy sales in many hours of the year.¹⁶⁰ The standard response to low spot prices for any seller of any commodity is

¹⁵⁸ See Congressional Budget Office, “**Causes and Lessons of the California Electricity Crisis**,” 22: “Had the utilities been able to enter into long-term contracts that guaranteed their future cost or supply of electricity, such arrangements would have helped diminish the shortage of power-generating capacity—and thus reduced the upward pressures on prices. Such long-term guarantees would have encouraged independent generators to build new capacity and would have improved the utilities’ financial position, so generators might not have charged higher prices as compensation for the risk of nonpayment by the utilities.” See also Ausubel and Cramton, “**Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design**,” 197. “The California electricity crisis of 2000-2001 illustrates all too well the problems that can arise when one relies excessively on the spot market. Key conditions of the crisis were insufficient forward contracting and tight supply. During this prolonged period of tight supply, the unhedged demanders were exposed to sustained high spot prices. Suppliers, also positioned without forward contracts, had strong incentives to exercise market power further exacerbating the high prices. The load serving entities, despite initially being well capitalized, ultimately teetered toward bankruptcy and the market collapsed.”

¹⁵⁹ Phadke et al., “**2035 The Report: Plummeting Solar, Wind, and Battery Costs Can Accelerate Our Clean Electricity Future**.”

¹⁶⁰ Milligan et al., “**Wholesale Electricity Market Design with Increasing Levels of Renewable Generation: Revenue Sufficiency and Long-Term Reliability**.” See also Seel, Mills, and Wiser, “**Impacts of High Variable Renewable Energy Futures on Wholesale Electricity Prices, and on Electric-Sector Decision Making**.”

to lock in long-term contracts in advance. But such contracts require a counterparty able and willing to sign them. Who that customer should be is not obvious, likely varies by state and region, and is the subject of significant discussion and debate.¹⁶¹

This chapter discusses roles and responsibilities of the 21st century electric system, how procurement responsibility may be allocated, and concludes with actions that policymakers and regulators should take to build effective market structures.

Roles and responsibilities in markets is called “market structure,” which is distinct from market design, and resides in the economic field of industrial organization. Large electricity customers would benefit to the extent an efficient market structure could be put in place in the electric industry. Even if an ideal structure is not something states have the political will to put in place, we start with the theoretically most efficient market structure as a useful framework and reference point to evaluate how to make other approaches work for customers.

RESILIENCE, RELIABILITY, AND MARKET STRUCTURE

Market structure must be placed into a broader context about electricity in modern life. Electric power is needed for public health and safety, and will continue to be “affected with the public interest,” in the words of the US Supreme Court. Regardless of market structure, ensuring

reliability and resilience will be essential. Increasingly, our critical infrastructure is inter-dependent between gas, water, and systems needed to keep people warm and safe. The Texas outages of February 2021 illustrate how such systems can fail. The investigations of this incident are only beginning at the time of this writing and all aspects of it will need to be reviewed. But some lessons appear to be clear from stressed system conditions in California in August 2020, Texas in February 2021, and Polar Vortex and other severe weather events over the last decade.

1. System planners need to incorporate future weather patterns which may be very different from the past. There are atmospheric science reasons to believe that Polar Vortices, widespread heat waves, hurricanes, and other severe weather events will be more frequent and severe than in the past. Current approaches to planning use past weather and load. Neither California¹⁶² nor Texas¹⁶³ planning assessments included the weather scenarios that actually occurred.
2. “Stress testing” should be performed in each region to consider their particular threats, the interaction of power, gas, water, and other critical infrastructure, and evaluate full system’s resilience. Early indications in Texas suggest that power was cut off to gas facilities, worsening gas shortages, that worsened power shortages. Such cross-sector interactions require full system planning and coordination in the future.

¹⁶¹ See generally Aggarwal et al., “Wholesale Electricity Market Design for Rapid Decarbonization,” Joskow, “Challenges for Wholesale Electricity Markets with Intermittent Renewable Generation at Scale,” World Resources Institute, “Electricity Market Design,” Gramlich and Lacey, “Who’s the Buyer? Retail Electric Market Structure Reforms in Support of Resource Adequacy and Clean Energy Deployment,” and New England States Committee on Electricity, “New England States’ Vision for a Clean, Affordable, and Reliable 21st Century Regional Electric Grid.”

¹⁶² California ISO, CPUC, CEC Root Cause Analysis: Mid-August 2020 Extreme Heat Wave, p. 40

¹⁶³ Load was well above ERCOT worst case estimates and generation was well below worst case estimates. <https://www.woodmac.com/news/editorial/breaking-down-the-texas-winter-blackouts/>

3. Winterization standards that were considered and rejected in Texas after its 2011 cold snap should be seriously considered as mandatory reliability rules, implemented at either the state or federal level. Early indications suggest that many facilities suffered from freezing, while it is clear that gas, wind, nuclear, solar, and coal plants are all capable of performing in very cold climates.

These regulations and policies on electricity generation are likely needed, and are compatible with the regulated market vision espoused here. In fact, such assessments and regulations would be equally needed in any kind of economic structure, ranging from fully regulated to fully competitive.

RELY ON COMPETITION IN GENERATION

The supply side of the market has been steadily moving toward a competitive market structure without economies of scale, or *natural monopoly* characteristics. Economists in the 1980s deemed the generation sector to be structurally competitive based on the smaller efficient scale of generating units and no longer subject to natural monopoly characteristics.¹⁶⁴ That finding was the basis for many states restructuring, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 encouraging competition, and FERC pursuing open access transmission to allow competition in the generation sector. The scale of wind, solar,

and storage plants is often 100-500 megawatts. Even where large projects are possible in remote rural areas, this scale is very small relative to the geographic market of generation which can span many states and be well over 100 gigawatts, or 1000 times the size of the efficient generator size. Thus, the sector has been structurally competitive for some time and is becoming much more so. And yet, a majority of generation is still owned by utilities rather than independent power producers.¹⁶⁵

A well-known market failure with regulated monopoly ownership is known as the Averch-Johnson effect in economics.¹⁶⁶ Regulated monopolies rewarded through standard cost-plus regulation will tend to inefficiently over-capitalize because they earn their money on the regulated returns of capital investments. It is a problem to be managed when the only or best structure is a regulated monopoly. It is a key reason to rely on competition for sectors that are structurally competitive.

The structural competitiveness of the electricity generation sector is evidenced by successful competitive solicitations for new generation all over the world in recent years.¹⁶⁷ Competitive solicitation has been advocated by electric consumer interests for decades.¹⁶⁸ Relying on competition increases the discipline on investments and operation relative to

¹⁶⁴ Joskow and Schmalensee, *Markets for Power*.

¹⁶⁵ 43 percent of sales were from independent power producers in 2019, 57 percent from utilities. See IPP data here: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Table 3.3.B. Net Generation from Renewable Sources: Independent Power Producers, 2009 - 2019," utility data here: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Table 3.2.A. Net Generation by Energy Source: Electric Utilities, 2009 - 2019," and total data here: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Table 3.1.A. Net Generation by Energy Source: Total (All Sectors), 2009 - 2019."

¹⁶⁶ See Averch and Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint."

¹⁶⁷ See Wilson et al., "Making the Most of the Power Plant Market: Best Practices for All-Source Electric Generation Procurement," Duke Energy, "Competitive Process Yields Carolinas' Biggest One-Day Collection of Solar Projects Ever; Significant Savings for Duke Energy Customers," International Renewable Energy Agency and Clean Energy Ministerial, "Renewable Energy Auctions: A Guide to Design," and USAID, "Tanzania: Competitive Procurement."

¹⁶⁸ Electricity Consumers Resource Council, "Profiles on Electricity Issues: Competitive Bidding."

monopoly-provided services. Utilities tend to want to own generation but states will likely lose some consumer savings given the incentives of utilities to add to their rate base unnecessarily.¹⁶⁹

Electricity customers would benefit by relying on competition for the electric generation sector. Competitive processes should be used both for investment and day to day operation. In many states where utilities still own generation, ending that practice may be politically impossible, but there are ways to increase the amount of competitive procurement.

Efficient retirement is just as important as efficient market entry in a competitive generation market. Customers may benefit from certain older resources staying online, based on energy or reactive power needs at a given location, system balancing, or low-carbon energy production, while other resources may provide little of any of these valuable services. Efficient market pricing for each separate service encourages valuable resources to stay online and less valuable resources to retire, benefitting customers. Technology-neutral service definitions rather than technology-specific procurement allows for competition between sources.

RECOGNIZE THE MONOPOLY TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SEGMENTS

Transmission and distribution remain natural monopoly sectors. As with other physical networks, having two competing sets of electric wires running down a street is highly inefficient. There are very large economies of scale, as well as public goods and network externalities that exist in transmission and distribution. While there is and will remain a role for independent transmission in some areas, the basic ownership for most of the transmission and distribution asset base is likely to remain in regulated private or public monopoly ownership for the foreseeable future.

Regulation of transmission and distribution can either follow traditional cost-of-service regulation or utilize performance-based regulation (PBR).¹⁷⁰ PBR requires objective performance metrics and significant regulatory policy oversight to assess performance, both of which would be significant challenges.¹⁷¹ Regulation can allow for limited competition where non-wires alternatives may substitute for the services needed.

In addition to regulation of natural monopoly transmission and distribution rates and services, there is a need for regulation of the vertical market power of a monopoly wires company from using its position to gain

¹⁶⁹ This is the well-established Averch-Johnson effect in utility regulation. See Averch and Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint."

¹⁷⁰ Joskow, "Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization," 16

¹⁷¹ Littell et al., "Next-Generation Performance-Based Regulation."

advantage in the competitive generation sector. The phrase *quarantine the monopoly* aptly describes the objective of preventing utilities from expanding into competitive sectors or using their advantage to benefit affiliates.¹⁷² Restructuring utilities to operate only in the monopoly sectors and not allowing them to use their monopoly position to benefit their involvement in upstream or downstream sectors can benefit consumers in an industry, including electricity.¹⁷³ Whether policymakers have the appetite to push for structural changes to limit franchise monopoly benefits to only monopoly sectors is another question. FERC open access transmission rules, and putting RTOs in charge of operation, also helps address vertical market power.

CONSIDER COMPETITIVE RETAIL SERVICE

Procuring a service, providing for its delivery, and selling to end-use customers is something that can be done competitively. It is performed in competitive markets for end-users in heating and cooling, plumbing, pest control, landscaping, cable TV, internet, and any number of other services. Retail electricity service can be a distinct service from distribution line ownership. It is difficult to make an economic policy argument for monopoly provision of retail electricity service. Competition in this sector, just like generation, can lead to more innovation in the services offered. However, there have been mixed experiences with retail competition in the 20 states that have tried it and the 14 states that

still have it.¹⁷⁴ And as an essential service where trust in the provider is critical, there is often little political support for moving away from granting regulated utilities a monopoly on retail service.

While there are known and fixable flaws with retail market design in the 13 states outside of Texas that would arguably make it function well,¹⁷⁵ it is a state policy decision and there does not appear to be a major push for retail competition expansion in many states at this time. There have not been many changes in state policy on this function in the last decade.

Retail competition in electricity likely requires a great deal of state regulatory oversight. Electricity is a risky business where shortages and very high prices can occur suddenly after years of low marginal cost-based prices. Many small residential customers are likely not aware of that risk when they sign up for suppliers, and many retail suppliers may themselves not be capable of preparing for such circumstances. Initial reports from the Texas cold snap of 2021 suggest that many retail suppliers will need to declare bankruptcy because they were not hedged against the high prices that occurred. It is not clear that the 0.1% of customers in Texas that pro-actively chose to use a supplier with a fully variable rate were aware of what risks they were taking on.¹⁷⁶ State policy makers will need to consider whether to allow certain customer classes to take on such risks in the future.

¹⁷² Phrase coined by then-Assistant Attorney General William Baxter. Joskow and Noll, "The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries." "...regulated monopolies have the incentive and opportunity to monopolize related markets in which their monopolized service is an input."

¹⁷³ Kiesling, "Electricity Restructuring and the Failure to Quarantine the Monopoly."

¹⁷⁴ Morey and Kirsch, "Retail Choice in Electricity: What Have We Learned in 20 Years?"

¹⁷⁵ Gramlich and Lacey, "Who's the Buyer? Retail Electric Market Structure Reforms in Support of Resource Adequacy and Clean Energy Deployment," and Desrosiers, "Competitive Electricity Retailing: Why Restructuring Must Go On."

¹⁷⁶ There are 29,000 customers of "Griddy" out of 29 million residents in the state of Texas. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/20/us/texas-storm-electric-bills.html>

RELY ON COMPETITION WHERE APPROPRIATE

If one is to follow the standard wisdom of industrial organization, there would be a market structure as follows:

TABLE 2
TEXTBOOK MARKET STRUCTURE

Segment	Structure
Transmission	Regulated monopoly utility
Distribution	Regulated monopoly utility
Generation	Competitive (no utility ownership allowed)
Grid operation, spot market operation	Regulated regional monopoly
Retail Service	Competitive or hybrid based on customer type

This textbook model follows the general best practices from electricity restructuring around the world over the last few decades. It is certainly not a free market, given the important role of regulation in all sectors and the full regulation of a single entity in key sectors. As articulated by Dr. Paul Joskow: “The most successful reform programs have followed the “textbook model” ... reasonably closely: privatization of state-owned enterprises, vertical and horizontal restructuring to facilitate competition and mitigate potential self-dealing and cross-subsidization problems, PBR regulation applied to the regulated

transmission and distribution segments, good wholesale market designs that facilitate efficient competition among existing generators, competitive entry of new generators, and retail competition, at least for industrial customers.”¹⁷⁷

In this competitive structure, the grid operator plays an important but limited role, like an air traffic controller of the system. It operates a spot market because of the need for real-time coordination of flows and congestion management each hour and day. But beyond a day ahead of time, the grid operator plays no role in the power market, leaving hedging and forward contracting to other entities as explained below.

¹⁷⁷ Joskow, “Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization.”

COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT IN A FULLY COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE CAN ACHIEVE LOW, LONG RUN PRICES

An under-appreciated component of the textbook competitive market structures such as ERCOT and Australia is the active long-term trading of power bilaterally among market participants. Observers often wonder how assets with 30 or 40 year lives can be financed on a merchant basis just by selling on an hour-to-hour basis. The answer is that they are not. As explained by Ausubel and Cramton,

Forward markets, both medium term and long term, complement the spot market for wholesale electricity. The forward markets reduce risk, mitigate market power, and coordinate new investment. In the medium term, a forward energy market lets suppliers and demanders lock in energy prices and quantities for one to three years. In the long term, a forward reliability market assures adequate resources are available when they are needed most. The forward markets reduce risk for both sides of the market, since they reduce the quantity of energy that trades at the more volatile spot price.¹⁷⁸

Generators that enter fully competitive markets tend to pre-sell their power under long-term contracts, or Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) for their energy output. Energy developers can secure lower cost financing if provided certainty through long-term PPAs with a credit-worthy counterparty willing to sign such agreements. Thus, from a project financing standpoint, fully competitive markets operate like the other industry structures; the International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that globally, 95 percent of generation is under some form of long-term contract or regulatory regime.¹⁷⁹

Sellers can also sell their environmental attributes on a forward basis to help finance plants. Even though RPS requirements may be year-to-year, private entities will transact longer term, such that generation developers may lock in environmental attribute sales years into the future.¹⁸⁰ If the public policies or the consumer demand are stable, there tend to be multiple entities that will take positions on future environmental attribute contracts, and report prices and trading in these markets.¹⁸¹ Liquidity (volume of trading) for multiple years ahead is increasing in the PJM region, for example, where the attributes trade independently of the central energy and capacity markets.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Ausubel and Cramton, "Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design."

¹⁷⁹ International Energy Agency, "World Energy Investment 2019," 134 & 136.

¹⁸⁰ Porter, Hoyt, and Widiss, "Final Report Concerning the Maryland Renewable Portfolio Standard as Required by Chapter 393 of the Acts of the Maryland General Assembly of 2017," 3-110.


¹⁸¹ Ibid., 1-110. See also Intercontinental Exchange, "PJM Tri Qualified Renewable Energy Certificate Class I Future."

¹⁸² Author personal communication with Goldman Sachs and sPower staff, December 2020.

Procurement in the textbook competitive model is entirely voluntary. It is performed by end-users themselves or the competitive retail suppliers who take on obligations to serve load. When they sign up end-use customers, they will then turn to power sellers and procure energy on their customers' behalf. Depending on how green the product chosen by their customer is, they may also procure environmental attributes. The procurement function in the fully competitive model is illustrated in Figure 17 below. In the Texas version, procurement is fully voluntary. In the Australia variant, there is some light-handed oversight by regulators to make sure retailers have lined up enough physical

supply to serve the load they committed to serve. Between load-serving entities (LSEs) and generators is often an entity called an "intermediary," which is a marketer or trader that takes financial positions in markets, often signing a PPA with a generator and then selling to LSEs. The generator can secure low cost debt financing from lenders when they have a PPA. That arrangement proves useful for competitive retailers who may not know from month to month or year to year how much load they must serve. The intermediary, however, knows how much load exists, and can be confident that whoever serves the load will need power.

FIGURE 17
HOW PROCUREMENT WORKS IN A FULLY COMPETITIVE POWER MARKET



Large electricity customers benefit from the flexibility of forward energy contracting. Unlike the real-time spot market where all power must be pooled and follow the exact same rules to ensure reliable coordination of the physical system, the longer-term contracting market can enable wide latitude for customers and sellers to transact as they choose. They can choose the contract term, types of products, the price, quantity, location, transmission responsibility, and many other factors. Each customer may have a different preference for all of those terms. Voluntary bilateral contracting enables that flexibility. Some customers may even wish to not hedge at all and take the risks of the spot market.

In the fully competitive model, wholesale market design plays a key role for short-term re-balancing of market participants' portfolios and encourages long-term procurement. The ERCOT and Australia markets have scarcity-based pricing such that when power is scarce, prices rise, as described in Chapter 4. The threat of paying high prices encourages competitive retail providers to procure power well in advance while locking in reasonable prices. In this way the central short-term spot market and the private long-term bilateral market complement and depend on each other. Very few people actually pay the high scarcity prices when they occur, because if everyone has done their job, power and prices were locked in well

ahead of time, and very little power is actually traded in the spot market.¹⁸³ Attracting the right amount of investment hinges on accurate spot prices, as stated by the ERCOT market monitor, "Although most suppliers are likely to receive the bulk of their revenues through bilateral contracts, the spot prices produced in the real-time energy market should drive bilateral energy prices over time."¹⁸⁴

There is no physical reserve margin or mandatory capacity requirement in the textbook competitive model. The actual reserve margin can be calculated, but it is an output of the market not an input. In 2019 when reserve margins were low and the weather was hot in ERCOT, scarcity conditions led to higher prices. As stated by the market monitor, "The increases in the frequency of sustained shortages is consistent with the declining reserve margin in recent years. This existence of operating shortages is not a concern. In an energy-only market, shortages play a key role in delivering the net revenues an investor needs to recover its investment. Such shortages will tend to be clustered in years with unusually high load or poor generator availability."¹⁸⁵ The 2019 reserve margin was 8.6 percent in 2019 and, likely based on high spot prices in 2019 and 2020, is projected to grow to 19.7 percent in 2022.¹⁸⁶ A study of the economically optimum reserve margin for ERCOT indicates that it is around 9 percent,¹⁸⁷ so it could be that the market is

¹⁸³ 87 percent of ERCOT load was hedged in 2018. See Potomac Economics, "2019 State of the Market Report for the ERCOT Electricity Markets," 36.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 69.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 72.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 76.

¹⁸⁷ Newell et al., "Estimation of the Market Equilibrium and Economically Optimal Reserve Margins for the ERCOT Region: 2018 Update."



actually achieving the optimum level, and was not too low in 2019. While everything about the Texas structure will undergo scrutiny after the outages in February 2021, there is little evidence that even if it had twice the reserve margin that the outcome would have been any different. There was plenty of generation, it just either failed to operate or lacked gas supply, which points more toward grid planning and weatherization.¹⁸⁸

The textbook competitive model can assemble the right “members of the orchestra,” to achieve system balancing in all hours. Market prices serve as the guide to whether more or less of a given resource would be valued. For example, if very high levels of wind, solar, or battery energy storage enter a market, the prices for those sources will tend to fall at the times those resources can produce. If one of them reaches more of a saturation point before the others based on the region’s resource mix or other factors, that signal will be sent. If there is very

high wind penetration relative to solar, or vice versa, prices will tend to attract the other source. In the last couple years, ERCOT has experienced high wind and solar growth but little storage. As a result, market prices are signaling storage to enter, with high scarcity-based prices when the sun goes down and air conditioning is still running. According to the ERCOT market monitor, “battery energy storage would have been highly profitable in 2019.”¹⁸⁹

For procurement to work in the textbook market structure, just like in any regulated model, the entity responsible for procurement must be credit-worthy, meaning financially sound enough to commit to multiple years of payments. Creditworthiness in the case of voluntary procurement by competitive retail suppliers is a matter of state regulatory policy. The Public Utility Commission (PUC) of Texas for example has much tighter creditworthiness requirements than any other states with retail access.¹⁹⁰ Given the inability of many retail providers to pay their bills after the cold snap, it is clear that many of the retail providers were not sufficiently capitalized to handle the risks in electricity markets. Higher creditworthiness requirements are likely in order. Many states may also wish to undertake planning for certain customer classes such that there is an insurance policy protecting them against risks they are not equipped to address.

Contracts for procurement in the fully competitive model can be either physical or financial. A financial contract might be a contract-for-difference with a target payment to

¹⁸⁸ Wood MacKenzie, “Breaking Down the Texas Winter Blackouts: What Went Wrong.”

¹⁸⁹ Potomac Economics, “**2019 State of the Market Report for the ERCOT Electricity Markets**,” 75.

¹⁹⁰ Public Utility Commission of Texas, Public Utility Regulatory Act. § 25.107, and Gramlich and Lacey, “Who’s the Buyer? Retail Electric Market Structure Reforms in Support of Resource Adequacy and Clean Energy Deployment.”

the supplier that adjusts based on whether the strike price is above or below the ultimate spot price. The load-serving entity's consumption is settled in the physical spot market, so they have an incentive to line up power that matches the time and location of their consumption.

Procurement in the fully competitive model is for either unbundled products, which can be traded in separate contracts, or bundled contracts. An end-use consumer may be served by energy, environmental attributes, and reliability services by different companies using different resources. If there were very high clean energy requirements, a generator might receive a large part of its revenue in a pre-arranged long-term environmental attribute sale and a lesser amount in forward energy and reliability services sales. The value in each of the services is determined by supply and demand for each service.

The textbook market structure has promise for working well with a decarbonized portfolio. Key features include large regional operation, fast dispatch, non-discriminatory engineering-based competitive procurement of reliability services, lack of subjective product definitions by incumbent stakeholders, scarcity-based pricing, free-flow of electricity within a region, competition fostering innovation in the generation and retail sectors, and the existence of long-term contracts to finance new generation.¹⁹¹ Three separate analyses of the application of the competitive model to a decarbonized portfolio found that the

keys to success are the existence of scarcity pricing and functional forward contracting.¹⁹² One of these analyses, focused on Australia concluded, "results suggest that existing energy-only market mechanisms have the potential to operate effectively in a 100 percent renewables scenario, but success will rely upon two critical factors. Firstly, an increase in the Market Price Cap is likely to be required... Secondly, a liquid and well-functioning derivative contracts market will be required to allow generators and retailers to hedge increased market risks successfully."¹⁹³

PROCUREMENT RESPONSIBILITY NEEDS TO BE CLEARLY ASSIGNED

There are many alternative ways that power procurement can be assigned. The role is very important given the problems that can occur if the system winds up short on power. The competitive model, as described above, relies on voluntary procurement by retail providers, and they are given the job of procuring power for the load they serve. Responsibility could lie with utilities, end-use customers that willingly take on the risk, government entities, community aggregators, or other entities. Whoever has the responsibility must be fully aware of the risks they are taking on. In the split jurisdiction area of the country outside of Texas, Hawaii, and Alaska, it is a state choice how they wish to organize their electric industry structure, but FERC will need to know that someone is responsible for power procurement for all customers. FERC could consider a certification program to make sure there is some entity that is capable of procuring sufficient power.

¹⁹¹ Hogan, "Electricity Market Design and the Green Agenda."

¹⁹² Riesz, Gilmore, and MacGill, "Assessing the Viability of Energy-Only Markets With 100% Renewables," Gramlich and Hogan, "Wholesale Electricity Market Design for Rapid Decarbonization: A Decentralized Markets Approach," and Gimon, "Let's Get Organized! Long-Term Market Design for a High Penetration Grid."

¹⁹³ Riesz, Gilmore, and MacGill, "Assessing the Viability of Energy-Only Markets With 100% Renewables."

CERTAIN ALTERNATIVES TO THE TEXTBOOK COMPETITIVE MODEL CAN ALSO WORK FOR CUSTOMERS

Many states have chosen not to pursue the textbook competitive model for various reasons. In some cases, consumer advocates have questioned the benefits and promised savings.¹⁹⁴ Utilities in a number of states have sponsored research critical of retail choice.¹⁹⁵ Other states where there is a split between federal (FERC) and state jurisdiction may not be able to harmonize wholesale and retail markets as Texas has been able to do.¹⁹⁶ Consumer advocates and utilities tend to be aligned in a coalition against full retail choice. There are also political difficulties in implementing full scarcity pricing, creditworthiness and other associated features that are needed in some regions, making the textbook competitive wholesale-retail design a challenge to put in place.¹⁹⁷

Outside of Texas, the other 13 states with retail competition would need to fix their retail designs for procurement responsibility to work on a voluntary basis. These other states likely have authority to create well-equipped electricity customers and assign them responsibility for firm energy and other product procurement but thus far have not chosen to use do that. State commissions have the power to license competitive retailers and they could make creditworthiness and



other standards a condition of obtaining such a license.¹⁹⁸ In those 13 states Provider of Last Resort (POLR) rules also undermine competitive retailers who do procure on a long-term basis.¹⁹⁹ These states have a choice – either fix these retail market flaws, or find another way to ensure prudent procurement.

In total, 49 out of 50 states have some form of physical reserve margin or capacity requirement. Whether it should or should not exist, large electricity customers must make it work. We turn to other models and how they can be made to procure the resources needed for reliable and efficient, decarbonized power systems.

¹⁹⁴ See, eg, Dance, “More Utility Competition Was Supposed to Drive Down Prices, but Many Marylanders Are Paying More for Energy.”

¹⁹⁵ Quilici et al., “Retail Competition in Electricity: What Have We Learned in 20 Years?”

¹⁹⁶ Tierney, “Wholesale Power Market Design in a Future Low-Carbon Electric System: A Proposal for Consideration.”

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ See, for example, The General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, *Massachusetts General Law, Ch. 164 § 1F*.

¹⁹⁹ Gramlich and Lacey, “Who’s the Buyer? Retail Electric Market Structure Reforms in Support of Resource Adequacy and Clean Energy Deployment.”

UTILITY CLEAN ENERGY PROCUREMENT CAN WORK FOR CUSTOMERS

Utilities plan for serving load in much of the country, even for many utilities in RTOs. Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) is performed by utilities in 32 states in order to determine energy and capacity needs, usually on a 3-4 year cycle. In recent years there have been many IRPs where a portfolio of wind + solar + storage + regional trading has been evaluated against options of keeping old fossil plants online or putting new gas generation in utility rate base.²⁰⁰

Large electricity customers can benefit from well-designed IRPs that evaluate the reliability of a clean energy portfolio, even if they do not get to make their own choices. It is essentially a monopsony, or single buyer model, where procurement is performed by a monopoly utility and regulated by state public utility regulators. There are a set of best practices that can be used to take advantage of generation competition and clean energy options, as explained by Wilson, Lehr, and O'Boyle.²⁰¹ A state can provide an open forum for stakeholders to revise planning assumptions in the planning model, use competitive solicitation for whatever new resource needs are called for, and make sure needs are defined on a technology neutral basis.²⁰² It will be important for electricity customers to make sure that utilities do not favor their

own generation in these procurements, including through utility affiliates. Customers will also want to ensure such processes are overseen by a sufficiently independent state utility regulator with technical capacity to mitigate information asymmetries and enforce competitive solicitation requirements. Energy procurement can also take place for clean energy and environmental attributes by utilities that have green tariffs. These purchases are driven not by a mandate but by the amount of customer demand that signs up to be served by clean energy.²⁰³

MANDATORY PROCUREMENT OF FIRM ENERGY CAN WORK FOR CUSTOMERS

For those states and RTOs not willing to rely fully on voluntary contracting and wholesale market prices, another option is a requirement to procure firm energy in advance. As described by Ausubel and Cramton, "The need for regulated forward markets in electricity comes largely from market failures on the demand side. Consumer demand response is limited; consumers have limited exposure to spot prices and have no ability to express preferences for reliability. As a result, in most markets, regulators establish the quantity of resources needed."²⁰⁴ These demand side flaws can be more of a problem in the U.S. outside of Texas where wholesale and retail markets are not harmonized by a common regulator.

²⁰⁰ Cooke, Twitchell, and O'Neil, "Energy Storage in Integrated Resource Plans."

²⁰¹ See Wilson, O'Boyle, and Lehr, "Monopsony Behavior in the Power Generation Market," and Wilson et al., "Making the Most of the Power Plant Market: Best Practices for All-Source Electric Generation Procurement."

²⁰² Lehr, "Utility Monopsony Regulation: What's Behind Low-Cost Wind and Solar Bids in Colorado?"

²⁰³ World Resources Institute, "Utility Green Tariffs."

²⁰⁴ Ausubel and Cramton, "Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design," 196.

Physical procurement requirements have been justified in electricity markets since the beginning of restructuring based on the “public good” nature of electricity supply.²⁰⁵ The result was a variety of capacity requirements and responsibilities, which are described in Appendix B. Some form of capacity payment has been incorporated into electricity markets in England and Wales Pool, the Single Electricity Market on the island of Ireland, Spain, Argentina, Italy, South Korea, and Chile.²⁰⁶

The product definition of *firm energy* is different from *capacity* and is intended to make sure this product includes more assurance than real-time energy, but with more performance

accountability than a pure “capacity” market. Forward firm energy requirements would be an improvement over the mandatory capacity markets that have been used in the U.S. Northeast. Firm energy can prevent some of the flaws of capacity markets, including defining the product as a physically backed call option on energy, advance forward contracting, and performance incentives tied to spot market operation.²⁰⁷ There have been efforts to improve on capacity markets by harmonizing them more closely with energy markets and real-time physical market performance. Capacity or firm energy as a call option with clearing based on spot prices is a popular notion.²⁰⁸ ISO/RTOs could also administer a voluntary market for such call options.²⁰⁹

The entity responsible for mandatory forward-firm energy contracting could be load-serving entities, states, or state-overseen processes similar to the New Jersey Base Generation Service auction.²¹⁰ In states with retail competition, the state could choose whether to assign the responsibility to competitive retailers or to utilities on the retailers’ behalf.

The policy requirement for forward firm energy contracting could be set by either an RTO under FERC jurisdiction, or a state. Jurisdiction in this area is somewhat murky. States have jurisdiction over both retail service and most aspects



²⁰⁵ Stoft, *Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity*. A public good is one that is non-rival (use by one entity does not reduce its use by another) and non-excludable (no entity can prevent another from using it). Public goods are one of the classic forms of “market failure” (along with externalities and natural monopoly) because their existence creates a free-rider problem where market participants on their own will under-procure the needed resource, in this case capacity.

²⁰⁶ Pöyry, “Balancing Resource Options: An Alternative Capacity Mechanism.”

²⁰⁷ Ausubel and Cramton, “Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design,” 199.

²⁰⁸ Pöyry, “Balancing Resource Options: An Alternative Capacity Mechanism,” 9-10.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ New Jersey Statewide Basic Generation Service Electricity Supply Auction, “BGS Auction.”

of generation. FERC's authority to mandate capacity purchases and capacity markets has been upheld by various courts²¹¹ despite any clear language in the Federal Power Act related to mandatory capacity requirements. Contrary to a common misunderstanding, NERC has no authority to set a resource adequacy standard or a reserve margin, but can only assess resource adequacy.²¹² FERC has approved a reserve margin in a tariff filing but whether or not FERC can really enforce that requirement has not been tested in court.²¹³

Whether forward contracting is voluntary or mandatory, some entity needs to have clear accountability for the function to ensure resource adequacy. Some customer classes may be able to handle this responsibility and may have the "financial resilience" and wherewithal to assume the risks inherent in power systems. Other customers may need to be treated more like drivers with mandatory auto insurance requirements because they may not be able to handle the risks. States will need to make these choices that involve policy preferences about how much choice to allow.

MANDATORY PROCUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ATTRIBUTES CAN WORK FOR CUSTOMERS

Many states with RPS have addressed the question of generator financing in their state policies. Recognizing that RECs are typically defined on a year-to-year basis which does

not enable long-term contracting to reduce financing costs, at least 11 states with RPS' also put in place long-term contracting requirements for renewable energy.²¹⁴ The contracting can be bundled energy and RECs, or RECs alone. Generation developers are able to sell firm energy or capacity to one entity, energy to another, and environmental attributes to a third entity. What matters for energy development is that each service is valued and there are electricity customers able and willing to commit to long-term purchases.

The entity responsible for long-term environmental attribute procurement can be the utility on behalf of all load, or competitive retailers for the load they serve.

In a review of U.S. power markets, Dr. Paul Joskow of MIT noted a key development, "State mandated procurement of hydro, wind, solar, and storage pursuant to long-term contracts in "restructured" market areas: Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York (and NYC), New Jersey, Maryland, DC, ...California, Nevada."²¹⁵ Dr. Joskow noted this dynamic of mandated procurement as a reality both in the U.S. and in many other countries, not necessarily as a positive development.

²¹¹ *Connecticut Department Of Public Utility Control v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission*.

²¹² NERC as the Electric Reliability Organization is only required to conduct "periodic assessments of the reliability and adequacy of the bulk-power system in North America." The Federal Power Act does not authorize the ERO (NERC) or FERC to "order the construction of additional generation or transmission capacity or to set and enforce compliance with standards for adequacy or safety of electric facilities or services." See *Federal Power Act*, 16 U.S. Code § 824o.

²¹³ ReliabilityFirst Corporation, "Petition of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and ReliabilityFirst Corporation for Approval of Proposed Regional Reliability Standard BAL-502-RF-03."

²¹⁴ Porter, Hoyt, and Widiss, "Final Report Concerning the Maryland Renewable Portfolio Standard as Required by Chapter 393 of the Acts of the Maryland General Assembly of 2017," ES-32.

²¹⁵ Joskow, "Hybrid Electricity Markets to Support Deep Decarbonization Goals."

PITFALLS WITH MANDATORY PROCUREMENT SHOULD BE AVOIDED

For large electricity customers to achieve the efficient, reliable, and low carbon grid they desire, a few cautions on mandatory procurement should be kept in mind. First and foremost, mandates should avoid the full shifting of risk back from investors to consumers. Placing risk on investors was the main benefit of restructured electricity markets because generators are very costly and bad generation investments that must be paid by consumers are the primary reason restructuring began.²¹⁶ The nuclear plant fiascos in South Carolina²¹⁷ and Georgia²¹⁸ are a reminder of the harm that bad investments and stranded costs can cause when risks are placed on consumers and not on investors.

Another pitfall to avoid is to make sure electricity customers actually get what they paid for. Performance has been a problem with suppliers of capacity in Northeast capacity markets and California resource adequacy. According to ISO-New England, gas generators that commit to provide capacity do not necessarily have firm pipeline supply contracts, and dual fuel units with onsite oil storage may not have sufficient fuel to last for more than a week, especially when there are competing uses of that fuel and weather-related forced outages that can disrupt supply from multiple generation sources.²¹⁹



²¹⁶ See Hartman, “Traditionally Regulated vs. Competitive Wholesale Markets,” and Cleary and Palmer, “US Electricity Markets 101.”

²¹⁷ Greenblatt, “South Carolina Spent \$9 Billion on Nuclear Reactors That Will Never Run. Now What?”

²¹⁸ Associated Press, “Costs of Nuclear Expansion at Georgia Power Plant Spiking.”

²¹⁹ Van Welie, Testimony of Gordon Van Welie President & Chief Executive Officer, ISO New England Before the US Senate Committee on Energy & Natural Resources.

PJM reported high coal plant failure rates in 2014 and 2018 cold weather episodes.²²⁰ Gas unit performance was poor during the recent California load shedding events.²²¹

Capacity markets, and the resource adequacy programs they serve, have had a fundamental problem that they are designed to achieve "adequate resources" to meet peak load, and they were not designed originally with performance in mind,²²² or the challenge of meeting the net load conditions of the future portfolio. While Northeast capacity markets have been evolving towards more performance incentives, this incentive is not as strong in capacity markets as it is in energy-only markets.²²³

If policymakers choose to continue or impose physical requirements, as is the case in 49 states, the physical metrics will need to evolve to fit the 21st century portfolio. The experience of capacity markets suggests there will be extensive debate over these requirements in state, RTO, FERC, and court proceedings.

Physical requirements imposed on electricity customers raises the question of whether the governance process of deciding those physical requirements adequately represents customer interests. Capacity market design is a product of

subjective stakeholder discussions and voting processes. A long list of design elements have been modified by stakeholders and approved by FERC that have led to very large excess reserve margins in some regions.²²⁴

Based on various design features, actual reserve margins that result from these subjective physical assessments has led to Northeast capacity markets that charge consumers for \$1.4 billion worth of excess capacity.²²⁵ Design is subject to the imposition of subjective features such as the Minimum Offer Price Rule. Current reserve margins are often equivalent to a value of lost load of \$200,000 to \$300,000/MWh²²⁶, which is 10 to 50 times the estimates of actual consumer valuation.²²⁷ It does not benefit customers to pay for extreme generation supply reliability when a dollar spent on local reliability would improve their reliability far more. Governance approaches must incorporate consumer interests to reflect appropriate valuation and definition of physical requirements.

Physical requirements can also lead to biases, intended or not. A group of economists showed how the incentive structure of capacity markets favored units with lower capital costs and higher operating costs than the cost profile of renewable sources.²²⁸

²²⁰ PJM, "PJM Cold Snap Performance Dec. 28, 2017 to Jan. 7, 2018."

²²¹ CAISO, CPUC, and CEC, "Preliminary Root Cause Analysis: Mid-August 2020 Heat Storm," 21.

²²² FTI Consulting, "Resource Adequacy Mechanisms in the National Electricity Market," 8.

²²³ Performance penalties in capacity markets are based on capacity prices, not spot energy prices. PJM Manual 18 p. 203.

²²⁴ Gramlich and Goggin, "Too Much of the Wrong Thing: The Need for Capacity Market Replacement or Reform."

²²⁵ Gramlich and Goggin, "Too Much of the Wrong Thing: The Need for Capacity Market Replacement or Reform," 7.

²²⁶ Patton, "Resilience and Emerging Issues in Wholesale Electricity Markets," 4.

²²⁷ While true VOLL varies by individual customer, economists have estimated it in various ways. The UK set a VOLL in their market design at 5,000 pounds or about \$7,500/MWh. The market monitor for ISO-NE, NYISO, and MISO estimates it to be \$4,000 to \$25,000. See Patton, "Resilience and Emerging Issues in Wholesale Electricity Markets." A London Economics study for ERCOT indicates VOLL in the neighborhood of \$4,000 to \$7,000/MWh for commercial and industrial customers: Frayer, Keane, and Ng, "Estimating the Value of Lost Load."

²²⁸ Mays, Morton, and O'Neill, "Asymmetric Risk and Fuel Neutrality in Electricity Capacity Markets."

Physical requirements also need to identify the actual services that are needed. As Bethany Frew from the NREL observed, “with an evolving grid and a dynamic market landscape, the questions and tools we use also need to change. Our questions should shift from ‘how many MWs do we need?’ to ‘what resources do we need to provide the full set of required system services under a wide range of possible futures?’”²²⁹

A quantifiable physical determination of how much firm energy will be needed in a decarbonized system is elusive. As the NERC Integrating Variable Generation Task Force concluded “planning reserve margin, calculated as a percentage of system peak, will become less meaningful with large penetrations of [variable generation].”²³⁰ Traditionally calculated reserve margins do not work well for the future resource mix because peak load is not the concern; what matters are the shortages that may result from the overlap of high load and low wind and solar output.²³¹ As a group of NREL researchers concluded, “system metrics such as LOLE [loss of load expectation] for system needs and ELCC [effective load carrying capability] for individual contributions may provide a better estimate for meeting long-term reliability needs, especially

if calculated on an hourly rather than daily basis.”²³² One change may be to shift toward “energy adequacy” and away from “capacity adequacy.” The former evaluates needs in all hours, while the latter is focused only on points in time.²³³ Alternative metrics should also include the magnitude of lost load as well as frequency, so Expected Unserved Energy (EUE) over a given time period is a promising replacement.²³⁴ By modeling each hour of the year based on probability distributions of wind, solar, and load, one can assess each hour’s EUE, then add it up across a year or multiple years. Policymakers can then compare such an estimate with an acceptable target EUE such as the traditional standard one day in 10 years, which is based on an arbitrary threshold and is interpreted to mean different amounts of load loss by different system planners.

Physical requirements should also be performed on a wide regional basis. A large part of the quantified economic savings from RTO benefit-cost studies is due to the lower reserve margin that is enabled by regional operation and sharing of capacity reserves.²³⁵ If reserves are shared then each utility needs less backup because statistically their shortfalls will tend to occur at different times so each generator can back up multiple systems, not just one.

²²⁹ Frew, “Beyond Capacity Adequacy.”

²³⁰ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Integration of Variable Generation Task Force: Summary and Recommendations of 12 Tasks,” 21.

²³¹ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Integration of Variable Generation Task Force: Summary and Recommendations of 12 Tasks,” 21. See also Ibanez and Milligan, “Comparing Resource Adequacy Metrics.”

²³² Milligan et al., “Wholesale Electricity Market Design with Increasing Levels of Renewable Generation: Revenue Sufficiency and Long-Term Reliability,” 30.

²³³ FTI Consulting, “Resource Adequacy Mechanisms in the National Electricity Market,” 18.

²³⁴ “Hourly EUE values should be reported for every month or year (i.e., 24 data points), as this is the only metric which considers magnitude of loss of load events.” See North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Probabilistic Adequacy and Measures.”

²³⁵ See MISO, “Value Proposition” and PJM, “PJM Value Proposition.”

How much each resource counts for firm energy will also need to evolve, when physical requirements are used. Capacity value is the metric of contribution to system capacity, as described in Chapter 2. Until recently, rough rules of thumb were used for wind and solar capacity value. Effective load carrying capability (ELCC) a probabilistic assessment of a resource's contribution to system reliability, is becoming popular with RTOs. ELCC accounts for whether each resource's contribution is correlated with others, such as the sun shining everywhere or the wind blowing at the same time. Use of ELCC would tend to encourage diversity of technologies and project locations to improve total reliability value. However, there are some challenges when using ELCC for markets: A resource's contribution is a function of what makes up the rest of the portfolio. As noted above, some resources such as wind, solar, and short-duration batteries are complementary such that more of one increases the capacity contribution of the other, while putting more of the same resource at the same location reduces ELCC. On the other hand, resources with similar output profiles reduce the other's capacity value.

For example, in PJM, whether storage is dispatched before or after demand response leads to a 47 percent²³⁶ ELCC with one method and 97 percent with another.²³⁷ These interactions make assigning clear credit to any one resource difficult. Retirements and additions of different resources can affect a resource's ELCC, which can thus conflict with efforts to undertake long-term contracting, particularly if capacity payments are a significant contribution to unit revenues. As gas generation has grown to make up a larger share of firm energy, planners have increasingly become concerned about the impact of correlated gas plant outages due to fuel supply interruptions, weather-driven generator outages, or pipeline outages.²³⁸ Traditionally, planners assumed that all generator forced outages were statistically independent events, with no correlation between any two plants' outages. Events like the 2014 Polar Vortex and the 2020 California load-shedding events have demonstrated this assumption is no longer valid. If ELCC is used for one set of resources, non-discriminatory access requirements would dictate that it be used for the others because other resources such as gas units can all be affected by common factors such as weather, just like renewables. ELCC was developed for non-renewable resources originally so it can apply equally well.²³⁹

²³⁶ Rocha-Garrido, "Public 1st Draft ELCC Results and the Process to Provide Preliminary ELCC Results."

²³⁷ Astrapé Consulting, "Dispatch Effects on Storage ELCC in PJM."

²³⁸ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "Reliability Guideline: Fuel Assurance and Fuel-Related Reliability Risk for the Bulk Power System."

²³⁹ NERC Integration of Variable Generation Task Force (IVGTF) states, "The fundamental calculations of LOLP, LOLE, and ELCC are not new, nor are they unique to variable generation. The reliability-based approach to calculating resource adequacy is a robust method that allows for the explicit estimate of the shortfall of generation to cover load. The traditional use of LOLE is to determine the required installed capacity, based on expected capacity during peak periods, and ELCC measures an individual generator's contribution to overall resource adequacy." See North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "Methods to Model and Calculate Capacity Contributions of Variable Generation for Resource Adequacy Planning," 9.

COORDINATED CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ATTRIBUTE PROCUREMENT SHOULD BE A STATE CHOICE, WITH PROS AND CONS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

A number of analysts believe the products of the clean energy portfolio should be centrally procured. In this way, there can be co-optimization and evaluation of the tradeoffs between firm energy, reliability services, and environmental attributes.²⁴⁰ There are many ways to co-optimize each of the services because all resources provide different amounts of each service, and there are portfolio interactions that can be used to consumers' benefit. At a minimum, tight coordination will be needed among procurement of the different products in order to co-optimize them. Whether that happens through separate unbundled product procurement or central procurement, it will benefit electricity customers to make sure this coordination and balancing occurs.

States could establish long-term procurements on their own or together with their neighbors. Multiple states could join to develop joint procurements.²⁴¹ A central procurement would require agreement from each participating state on the products to be procured. States also may be cautious about turning over jurisdiction of environmental attributes to FERC, which could happen in a regional central procurement of bundled products.

LONG-TERM PROCUREMENT OF OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY SERVICES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

In many markets, there is mandated long-term contracting for capacity through RTO capacity markets and renewable energy state requirements, but reliability services are only compensated in hourly markets. In principle, market participants could enter this void and provide hedging services to suppliers and load, as they do in Texas for energy. But there should not be a policy bias against flexible resources by having policy mandates for long-term contracting for products that fossil resources sell (capacity)²⁴² but flexible resources do not.

Long-term purchases of flexibility services are uncommon at present. The California PUC requires utilities to procure flexibility, in addition to firm energy.²⁴³ Several states have energy storage deployment targets, which provide stable long-term demand signals for storage resources that can provide flexibility.

²⁴⁰ See Future Power Markets Forum, "Central Procurement Structures for Energy, Capacity, and Environmental Products."

²⁴¹ See New England states discussions: NESCOE, "New England States' Vision for a Clean, Affordable, and Reliable 21st Century Regional Electric Grid."

²⁴² As noted earlier, capacity markets disfavor resources with the cost profiles of renewable sources. See Mays, Morton, and O'Neill, "Asymmetric Risk and Fuel Neutrality in Electricity Capacity Markets."

²⁴³ California Public Utilities Commission, "Resource Adequacy Compliance Materials."

SUMMARY OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND PROCUREMENT FOR A CLEAN PORTFOLIO

State and federal policy makers should encourage an efficient market structure in which the structurally competitive sectors are open to competition and the natural monopoly sectors remain regulated. The generation sector is structurally competitive and relying on competition with appropriate regulations on reliability and market power would benefit customers. Monopoly transmission and distribution owners should be prevented from gaining advantage in competitive sectors.

An effective procurement function should be a particular focus of policy makers. One approach is the textbook competitive structure where end-users or competitive retail suppliers voluntarily procure power for the load they serve. Retail competition can work with appropriate regulation to make sure sufficient procurement takes place by credit-worthy entities.

Where states opt not to put in place well-functioning retail competition, alternative procurement structures will be needed. RTOs or states may require long-term forward procurement of firm energy to ensure load can be served at all times. Defining the physical requirement will be a challenge and will need to use new metrics rather than past resource adequacy approaches. States may require long-term contracts for environmental attributes to help finance generation.

Any long-term procurement requirements should avoid shifting too much risk to consumers, avoid excessive purchase requirements, and ensure actual performance not just “steel in the ground.”

FERC should work with restructured states to re-evaluate resource adequacy approaches. In addition to eliminating broad application of MOPR, FERC and states should work together on resource adequacy approaches that support electricity customer purchases and state policies while maintaining reliability.

CHAPTER 6:

TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT FOR A CLEAN PORTFOLIO



Doubling or tripling the delivery capacity of the U.S. electric grid, as decarbonization studies show is needed, will be a massive undertaking. Chapter 2 described how a clean energy portfolio can work, and surveyed the research on how much transmission is needed to enable large movements of power spatially across and between regions. Even without considering the variable and remote nature of renewable energy, the increasing severity and frequency of extreme weather events that can affect generation and load justifies a focus on inter-regional transmission connections as a resilience measure. Transmission investment must be addressed through different approaches than the approaches to generation investment described in Chapter 5 because transmission largely remains a natural monopoly and fully regulated segment of the industry. This chapter describes how transmission investment can be fostered.

THE CURRENT APPROACH IS INEFFICIENT

The current industry and regulatory structure described in Chapter 2 was not designed for large movements of power between utilities, states, or regions. There are approximately 500 transmission owners in the country whose investment cost recovery mechanisms were set up to recover costs on their local systems, not large regional investments. If changes are not made, we will continue following a very inefficient approach to transmission. Presently:

- There is very little large scale regional or inter-regional transmission being planned.²⁴⁴
- Instead, many billions of dollars are being spent by utilities in their local systems.²⁴⁵ Such investments have a presumption of prudence and a clear pathway for utility cost recovery, and many of these investments could be avoided or made more efficient if part of a coordinated regional plan.
- Generator interconnection queues are overwhelmed with hundreds of gigawatts of projects,²⁴⁶ which are being assigned costs of shared network upgrade costs on a project-by-project or cluster-by-cluster basis, without consideration of the efficiencies of planning for future needs in likely renewable resource areas. Typically, new generation in a resource area will reach a transmission limit, then the costs assigned to individual generators balloon. For example, historically in MISO, interconnecting wind projects have incurred interconnection costs of \$0.85 per megawatt hour (MWh) or \$66 per kilowatt (kW) but recently, newly proposed wind projects now face interconnection costs that are nearly five times higher, at \$4.05/MWh or \$317/kW.²⁴⁷ This is about 23 percent of the capital cost of building a wind project. The most recent 2019 system impact study for solar projects in MISO South estimated upgrade costs to total \$307/kW, with upgrade costs for individual interconnection requests as high as \$677/kW.²⁴⁸ This direct assignment, also called “participant funding,” of interconnection costs leads generators to drop out of queues, and creates a self-reinforcing cycle of queue changes, delays, and logjams.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁴ Coalition of MISO Transmission Customers, Industrial Energy Consumers of America, and LS Power Midcontinent, LLC, **Section 206 Complaint and Request for Fast Track Processing**, 31-32; PJM, “**Project Statistics**,” 6; La Nickell, “Transmission Investment in SPP,” 5; CAISO, “**Transmission Planning for a Reliable, Economic and Open Grid**,” years 2012-2021 available under “Transmission planning and studies” section of webpage; CAISO, “**2011-2012 Transmission Plan.**”; Casey, “**Briefing on 2010 Transmission Plan.**”; and ISO-NE, “**Transmission.**”

²⁴⁵ Pfeifenberger et al., “**Cost Savings Offered by Competition in Electric Transmission: Experience to Date and the Potential for Additional Customer Value**,” 4: “Significant investments have been made, but relatively little has been built to meet the broader regional and interregional economic and public policy needs envisioned when FERC issued Order No. 1000. Instead, most of these transmission investments addressed reliability and local needs.” “...about one-half of the approximately \$70 billion of aggregate transmission investments by FERC-jurisdictional transmission owners in ISO/RTO regions [was] approved outside the regional planning processes or with limited ISO/RTO stakeholder engagement,” 6-7.

²⁴⁶ At the end of 2019, 734 gigawatts of proposed generation were waiting in interconnection queues nationwide. Wiser et al., “**Wind Energy Technology Data Update: 2020 Edition**,” 18. See also underlying data in the “**2020 Wind Energy Technology Data Update**” accompanying the slide deck.

²⁴⁷ Gorman, Mills, and Wiser, “**Improving Estimates of Transmission Capital Costs for Utility-Scale Wind and Solar Projects to Inform Renewable Energy Policy**,” 10.

²⁴⁸ MISO, “**Final MISO DPP 2019 Cycle 1 South Area Study Phase I Report**,” 8-15.

²⁴⁹ Caspary et al., “**Disconnected: The Need for a New Generator Interconnection Policy**.”

CUSTOMERS CAN BENEFIT SIGNIFICANTLY FROM HIGH VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION


Transmission has extremely large economies of scale such that the cost per delivered MW is much lower for larger investments. As shown in Figure 18, high-voltage lines carry exponentially more power than lower-voltage lines, and are far more cost-effective due to economies of scale.²⁵⁰

High-voltage lines also greatly reduce losses compared to lower-voltage lines, with 765-kV AC lines, the highest voltage in operation in the U.S., experiencing one-eighth to one-

quarter the losses of more common 345-kV transmission lines per amount of power transferred.²⁵¹ This is possible because the power transfer capacity of a line is determined by the voltage times the current (or amperage), while losses generally increase in proportion to the square of the current. As shown in the following table created by PJM, increasing the voltage allows far more power to be transmitted at the same current, and thus a comparable amount of losses.²⁵² In Table 3, two numbers are shown for each voltage class to represent lower and upper bounds for power and current.

FIGURE 18
TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE ECONOMIES OF SCALE

Transmission Voltage (kV)	Cost per Mile (\$/mile)	Capacity (MW)	Cost per Unit of Capacity (\$/MW-mile)
230	\$2,077 million	500	\$5,460
345	\$2,539 million	967	\$2,850
500	\$4,328 million	2040	\$1,450
765	\$6,578 million	5000	\$1,320



²⁵⁰ Fabricators & Manufacturers Association, International.

²⁵¹ American Electric Power, "Transmission Facts," 4.

²⁵² PJM, "The Benefits of the PJM Transmission System," 9.

TABLE 3
HIGHER VOLTAGE LINES ALLOW FAR MORE POWER DELIVERY

Voltage Class	Power (MVA)	Current (AMPS)
765 kV	4,000	3,079
	5,400	4,157
500 kV	2,500	2,887
	3,500	4,041
345 kV	1,000	1,673
	2,000	3,347
230 kV	420	1,054
	1,250	3,138

Networks like the power grid feature non-arithmetic economies of scale. Initial investments reduce the cost and increase the benefits of subsequent investments, yielding positive externalities that are difficult to quantify. For example, once a region's power system has overcome the initial cost hurdle of adding substations and power lines that operate at a higher voltage, the cost of connecting additional lines to those substations is reduced because a significant share of the needed substation equipment already exists.

Similarly, moving from two to three parallel transmission lines increases the amount of transmission capacity that can be safely used by 100 percent for only a 50 percent increase in transmission costs; with only two lines, their total utilization would be limited to the capacity of a single line because the other line's capacity

must be held in reserve to prevent an overload in case one of the lines failed. As an example, NV Energy in Nevada is planning to add two new 525-kV transmission lines to supplement the existing 525-kV line connecting the northern and southern portions of the state. The single existing line can only be used at a fraction of its potential capacity because of reliability concerns that would result if the line were to be taken offline by a contingency event.²⁵³ However, because 525-kV substations were already built at both ends of the existing transmission line, only one additional 525-kV substation is required to add the two new lines. Thus, the initial line reduces the cost of the additional lines and increases their benefits, demonstrating large economies of scale. In turn, the addition of the two new lines and the additional substation opens up multiple opportunities to build new high-voltage lines to connect to neighboring power systems.²⁵⁴

²⁵³ NV Energy, "Greenlink Nevada," 13-19.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., at 22-26

The net result of the current transmission investment framework is that electricity customers are likely paying too much for some kinds of transmission and missing opportunities to achieve lower delivered costs that would be available with pro-actively planned transmission at more efficient scales. Transmission has extremely large economies of scale such that the cost per delivered MW is much lower for larger investments. Continuing the incremental approach to transmission is penny-wise and pound-foolish.

A number of studies quantify the customers benefit from larger-scale transmission. A study of the Eastern Interconnect showed the customer benefit of accessing low-cost renewables even after paying for large scale transmission can cut consumers electric bills by \$100 billion and decrease the average electric bill rate by more than one-third, from over 9 cents/kWh today to around 6 cents/kWh by 2050, saving a typical household more than \$300 per year.²⁵⁵ As noted in Chapter 3, a study

by MIT found that inter-state coordination and transmission expansion reduces the cost of zero-carbon electricity by up to 46 percent compared to a state-by-state approach.²⁵⁶

Transmission benefits system resilience, as it is there when anything happens to inherently unpredictable levels of generation and load. As ERCOT and the Texas public utility commission explained in comments to FERC, “One of the most critical elements of system resilience is ensuring that the transmission system is planned in such a way as to ensure continued operations following an unexpected outage of one or more generators or transmission elements.”²⁵⁷ Similarly, the New York grid operator noted that “These interconnections support and bolster reliability and resilience by creating a larger and more diverse resource pool available to meet needs and address unexpected and/or disruptive events throughout an interconnected region.”²⁵⁸ As noted by Dr. Frank Wolak of Stanford University:



Expansion of the transmission network typically increases the number of independent wholesale electricity suppliers that are able to compete to supply electricity at locations in the transmission network served by the upgrade. With the exception of the U.S., most countries re-structured at a time when they had significant excess transmission capacity, so the issue of how to expand the transmission network to serve the best interests of wholesale market participants has not yet become significant. In the U.S., determining how to expand the transmission network to serve the needs of wholesale market participants has been a major stumbling block to realizing the expected benefits of electricity industry re-structuring.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁵ Clack et al., “Consumer, Employment, and Environmental Benefits of Electricity Transmission Expansion in the Eastern U.S.”

²⁵⁶ Brown and Botterud, “The Value of Inter-Regional Coordination and Transmission in Decarbonizing the US Electricity System.”

²⁵⁷ ERCOT and PUCT Comments to FERC, March 2018, Docket AD18-7.

²⁵⁸ NYISO Comments to FERC, March 2018, Docket AD18-7.

²⁵⁹ Wolak, “Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity,” 8.

TRANSMISSION INDUSTRY STRUCTURE REQUIRES A REGULATORY, NON-MARKET APPROACH

Transmission is optimally structured as a regulated monopoly because of its economies of scale, network externalities, and public goods characteristics. These market failures make the sector ill-suited to competition. Traditional public utility regulatory approaches apply to transmission. While there have been attempts in many regulated industries to use more performance-based regulation, the basic approach of planned and regulated investments, regulatory cost allocation and recovery with cost-of-service regulation will generally apply. Regulated network investments is compatible with the competitive generation sector. As one of the leading architects of energy markets, Dr. William Hogan of Harvard University explained, “if there were no economies of scale and scope for transmission investment, electricity markets could follow the same competitive model for transmission where beneficiaries determine and pay for their own investments. Given the large economies of scale and scope, transmission is a natural monopoly and investment requires a central coordinator.”²⁶⁰

If instead one were to rely on voluntary investment by unregulated market participants on a voluntary basis (as in a competitive market), there would likely be under-supply of the infrastructure as Dr. Hogan’s paper explains. That is the expected result with both natural monopolies and public goods market failures. Regulation is required to create the expanded capacity. Similarly Dr. Paul Joskow, the economist who promoted generation competition with his 1983 book *Markets for Power*, stated:²⁶¹

There are numerous reasons why we should not expect the market to produce transmission enhancements that meet reasonable economic and reliability goals. Indeed, proceeding under the assumption that, at the present time, the market will provide needed transmission network enhancements is the road to ruin. There is abundant evidence that market forces are drawing tens of thousands of megawatts of new generating capacity into the system. There is no evidence that market forces are drawing significant quantities of entrepreneurial investments in new transmission capacity. While third parties should be given the opportunity to propose market-based private initiatives to expand transmission capacity, incumbent transmission owners, in the context of a sound RTO/ISO planning process, must be relied upon to play a central role in expanding the transmission system.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Hogan, “Transmission Investment Beneficiaries and Cost Allocation: New Zealand Electricity Authority Proposal,” 1.

²⁶¹ Joskow and Schmalensee, *Markets for Power*.

²⁶² Joskow, *Comments of Professor Paul L. Joskow*, v.

Theoretically, the best way to enable the large regional and inter-regional transmission capacity investments would be to have a national regulator of all transmission with standard public utility regulatory powers. In a standard regulatory approach, the regulator can compel a planning process and investments deemed to be needed, allocate the costs across all beneficiaries which might include the entire interconnection, and set reasonable rates.

The U.S. does not currently have a regulator that has clearly been given such powers, or used the powers that exist in federal law. As Dr. Joskow recently observed, “Barriers to expanding the needed inter-regional and internetwork transmission capacity are being addressed either too slowly or not at all.”²⁶³ Only tepid encouragements from FERC for planning authorities to coordinate on inter-regional planning have been instituted thus far.

An effective market and regulatory structure to achieve efficient investment in transmission requires removal of three types of barriers, sometimes referred to as the 3 P’s: planning, permitting, and paying (cost allocation). We take each in turn.

PLANNING IS NEEDED TO EXPAND INFRASTRUCTURE


Enabling large transfers of power between and across regions requires regional and interregional planning. The value of transmission comes not only from regular use but the ability to assist each area in their unique times of need. Every line affects the value of every other line since electricity follows a path of least resistance and moves on parallel paths. Ideally, transmission planning would cover full interconnections and even optimize planning between the interconnections. Figure 19 shows U.S. Planning Authorities which cover only parts of regions.

Planning also needs to be pro-active to anticipate the resource mix 10 years into the future in order for transmission to be ready in time and to meet customer and policymakers’ objectives. Presently, there is little attention in any region to the long-term system needs.

Planners need to have sufficient authority to actually make plans. Currently, the planning authorities above tend to mostly roll up what is reported from utilities in their region. While that process can serve to identify any inconsistencies, it does not capture the efficiencies of a true regional plan.

²⁶³ Joskow, “Transmission Capacity Expansion Is Needed to Decarbonize the Electricity Sector Efficiently.”

FIGURE 19
CURRENT TRANSMISSION PLANNING AUTHORITIES²⁶⁴



FERC has attempted to regionalize transmission and move away from the siloed utility-by-utility approach. The Commission issued a 1993 Regional Transmission Group Policy Statement,²⁶⁵ Order No. 888 in 1996 encouraging ISOs with a transmission planning function,²⁶⁶ Order No. 2000 in 1999 encouraging RTOs with transmission planning as one of the key functions, Order No. 890 in 2007 providing specific planning guidance,²⁶⁷ and Order No. 1000 in 2011 providing more planning requirements.²⁶⁸

Despite these attempts by FERC to regionalize electric infrastructure, there is a wide gap

between the large regional and inter-regional planning needed for a reliable decarbonized grid and where the industry currently stands. New regulations will be required to fill this gap in planning. Legislation directing FERC to undertake these changes would provide support for FERC action that could come in handy in court proceedings if and when it is challenged. There have been bills in both the U.S. Senate and House in recent years directing FERC to review and undertake a process to improve inter-regional planning.²⁶⁹ Such legislation would clarify and strengthen FERC's ability to undertake the type of planning required.

²⁶⁴ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Order No. 1000 Transmission Planning Regions."

²⁶⁵ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission Groups; Policy Statement."

²⁶⁶ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080.

²⁶⁷ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order No. 890, 118 FERC ¶ 61,119.

²⁶⁸ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051.

²⁶⁹ See Heinrich, S.3109 - Interregional Transmission Planning Improvement Act of 2019 and Section 212 of Haaland, H.R.5511 - Interregional Transmission Planning Improvement Act of 2019. See also House appropriations language: "The Committee recognizes the importance of interregional transmission planning to the effective deployment of renewable energy sources and encourages FERC to undertake a review to evaluate the effectiveness of its existing interregional transmission coordination requirements and consider specific improvements to those requirements that would better promote the identification and development of more efficient and cost-effective transmission facilities and cost allocation methodologies that reflect the multiple benefits provided by interregional transmission facilities." See Kaptur, Energy and Water Development and Related Appropriations Bill, 2021.

Peter Fox-Penner recently made one of his main recommendations in his book *Power After Carbon*, “National governments (notably in the United States) should provide national-level leadership and establish stakeholder mediation processes that enable new or expanded transmission projects emerging from these planning processes to be permitted, funded, and built without substantial delays.”²⁷⁰

A study comparing proactive planning to reactive planning found significant benefits to proactive planning because it is able to co-optimize generation and transmission:

Transmission planning has traditionally followed a *generation first or reactive* logic, in which network reinforcements are planned to accommodate assumed generation build-outs. The emergence of renewables has revealed deficiencies in this approach, in that it ignores the interdependence of transmission and generation investments. For instance, grid investments can provide access to higher quality renewables and thus affect plant siting. Disregarding this complementarity increases costs. In theory, this can be corrected by proactive transmission planning, which anticipates how generation investment responds by co-optimizing transmission and generation investments... We estimate cost savings from co-optimization compared to both reactive planning and an approach that iterates between generation and transmission investment optimization. These savings turn out to be comparable in magnitude to the amount of incremental transmission investment.²⁷¹

In order to co-optimize generation and transmission planning, the simple first step is for planners to incorporate state and utility resource goals into their plans. Today, that is generally not done, resulting in a flood of generation projects into interconnection queues, where they require shared network upgrades to be efficiently connected, yet the interconnection process only incrementally builds what is needed for the generator or cluster of generators, not what may be known to be needed to meet these utility and state resource plans.

To ensure electricity customers benefit from transmission expansion planning, FERC and RTOs should make much more and better use of benefit-cost analysis. Many lines and plans will likely show net benefits, but not all. As Dr. Hogan explains, the appropriate methodology for transmission planning is Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA): “A forward-looking cost-benefit analysis provides the gold standard for ensuring that transmission investments are efficient.”²⁷² He continues to explain BCA as the only reasonable option for efficient grid planning:

There is no other way of determining whether a grid investment is efficient. Whatever the purpose of the grid investment, it will only be efficient if the benefits it provides – for example, in terms of lower energy production costs or increased reliability – exceed the cost of the investment. No investment should proceed without being subject to a cost-benefit assessment which quantifies all benefits and costs.²⁷³

²⁷⁰ Fox-Penner, *Power After Carbon*, 284. Also personal communication with the author regarding the importance of this recommendation relative to others in the book.

²⁷¹ Spyrou et al., “What Are the Benefits of Co-Optimizing Transmission and Generation Investment? Eastern Interconnection Case Study.”

²⁷² Hogan, “Transmission Investment Beneficiaries and Cost Allocation: New Zealand Electricity Authority Proposal,” 1.

²⁷³ Ibid., 5.

In addition to regional planning authorities' planning work under the direction of FERC, the U.S. Department of Energy could help with the development of large scale inter-regional planning. Transmission planning requires both extensive engineering analysis and stakeholder engagement. Both of those require significant resources and project management capabilities which DOE possesses.

The institutional structure of planning authorities should be reviewed to ensure they have the authorities and geographic scope to allow large scale regional and inter-regional transmission to be built. The institutions could be the same organizations as the operator of the markets but don't necessarily need to be. The functions of the transmission planning side of RTOs and the market operations side are sufficiently distinct enough that they could be performed by different entities. One of the main benefits of RTOs is that they provide a regional tariff through which to recover the costs of transmission expansion. Some organization with a regional tariff will likely be necessary.

These reforms are significant and will require federal leadership. As one review of transmission concluded, "The primary barriers to building new high-voltage lines and optimizing the grid aren't so much technical or economic but rather bureaucratic. Inefficient institutions and insufficient policies are the key factors preventing the U.S. from accessing its rich resources of clean energy."²⁷⁴ It continued,

"These transmission facilities typically must span hundreds of miles, carry price tags of hundreds of millions of dollars, and most significantly, cross many boundaries of a balkanized regulatory framework that emerged almost a century ago for local monopolies organized around central power plants serving retail markets. This institutional structure is fundamentally unsuited to the task of planning and building modern, efficient, regional and interregional transmission."²⁷⁵

PERMITTING ACTION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL IS NEEDED

While there is a federal permitting regime for natural gas pipelines, no such regime exists for electric transmission. It will be very difficult if not impossible to build a nationwide network of transmission with a state- and locality-based permitting regime.²⁷⁶ The most obvious solution is to provide the same regime for electric transmission as applies to gas pipelines, though that will likely be politically difficult.

Three statutory provisions from the Energy Policy Act of 2005 could be utilized more by executive agencies.²⁷⁷ Section 1221 allows DOE to designate National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors over private land and gives permitting authority within these corridors to FERC. Section 1222 enables Power Marketing Administrations to partner with private developers to plan and develop transmission in the footprints of the PMAs. Section 368 provides for DOE coordination of transmission corridors over public lands.

²⁷⁴ Jimison and White, "Transmission Policy: Planning for and Investing in Wires," 5.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 7.

²⁷⁶ A vivid illustration of the flaws of such a system are described Gold, *Superpower: One Man's Quest to Transform American Energy*.

²⁷⁷ A thorough description of these authorities and how they can be utilized going forward can be found in Zevin et al., "Building a New Grid Without New Legislation: A Path to Revitalizing Federal Transmission Authorities."

PAYING (COST ALLOCATION) SHOULD CONSIDER THE BROAD BENEFITS OF TRANSMISSION

Cost allocation is the primary barrier to ensuring sufficient transmission is built. While utilities have ways of recovering costs in rates of investments in distribution systems and lower voltage local transmission, there is not a currently functioning means of recovering costs of large scale regional and inter-regional transmission, even though there is plenty of available private capital. Given the broad national benefits of power system resilience and decarbonization to public health, security, and welfare, Congress should consider federal funding of a macro grid. The inter-state highway system with 90 percent federal funding and 10 percent local funding might be a model.

Transmission is not only a natural monopoly but a public good, like national defense or the road system, where everyone benefits but it is in no individual's interest to pay. This "free rider" problem drives many of the failures to plan transmission, as regions refuse to plan inter-regional transmission if they believe they will have to pay for it but another region will benefit from it. Even within regions, transmission planning is often siloed into transmission projects to address reliability, economic, or generator interconnection needs because each type of project has a different cost allocation. This inhibits planners from being able to identify transmission projects that optimally address all of those needs, and

also results in a free rider problem in which the stakeholders that would have to pay for a certain type of line refuse to plan it in hope that another stakeholder group will pay for it. In particular, many regions are increasingly failing to plan for needed transmission and instead relying on interconnecting generators to pay for most of the grid upgrades, even though those upgrades provide economic and reliability benefits to all electricity customers. Public goods are typically funded by taxpayers through government programs such as the budgets for the Department of Defense or Transportation. There is close to zero funding for energy infrastructure in the DOE's budget. Instead, electricity infrastructure is funded through utility rates. However the scope of utility regulation is currently misaligned - each utility is tasked with serving its local area and keeping up its local utility system of transmission and distribution, but not to address large regional and inter-regional needs.

There have been some recent successful models of sharing costs for regional transmission in a way that enabled the infrastructure to be financed and built.²⁷⁸ ERCOT Competitive Renewable Energy Zones, MISO Multi-Value Projects, and SPP Priority Projects each connected more than 10 GW of renewable energy and improved regional reliability and resilience. Federal leadership at FERC and DOE will be needed to pursue more such planning and cost allocation initiatives.

²⁷⁸ Trabish, "3 Transmission Projects That Illustrate the Importance in Modernizing the Grid."

MERCHANT TRANSMISSION WILL PLAY A ROLE

There are many gaps in the current system of regulated transmission creating opportunities for merchant developers to finance the transmission on their own without any regulated rate base to fund the lines. The model has worked in limited instances, where the developer can secure voluntary capacity commitments by market participants. The opportunities should remain open for merchant development. It is not likely to meet close to the efficient needs for the reasons described by economists above.

DISINCENTIVES FOR GRID-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES SHOULD BE REMOVED

Along with investment in transmission lines and large physical assets, there are a set of new technologies that can increase delivery over existing lines. Very often these technologies can reduce costly congestion by 30 percent or more. The benefits of such technologies on a regional or national scale are on the order of the benefits

of RTOs.²⁷⁹ FERC recently coined a new term for these technologies in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on transmission incentives: Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). Whether to deploy GETs is a decision under the control of transmission owners, not planners. GETs could be incorporated more into transmission planning, but there are limitations on how they fit into planning or how FERC could require their use. Incentives are the more viable pathway to bring GETs into wide deployment. FERC can address incentives (remove the disincentive) through its incentives policy implementing EPC Act Section 219b3, a provision specifically tailored to these technologies and which FERC has never specifically implemented.

Additionally, FERC should provide transmission customers the ability to request the increased service that would be available with GET deployment. This could apply in both the interconnection and transmission service context.

²⁷⁹ Tsuchida and Gramlich, "Improving Transmission Operation with Advanced Technologies: A Review of Deployment Experience and Analysis of Incentives."

MORE OVERSIGHT OF TRANSMISSION IS NEEDED TO BUILD CUSTOMER CONFIDENCE

It is only in recent years that many transmission assets have moved into federal jurisdiction, and out of state PUC jurisdiction. There has never been a full adjustment to this new reality. FERC's authority does not contain many of the standard regulatory tools of a public utility regulator. FERC has tended in the past to engage in resolving disputes rather than actively regulating to ensure investments are just and reasonable. And there are gaps in oversight over transmission investment.

The current FERC rules and incentives lead utilities to invest largely in local upgrades on their own system. There has been significant concern on the part of wholesale customers that some of these investments are not valuable and there is too little oversight. Cost recovery flows through formula rates and informational filings at FERC rather than standard public utility practice of pre-approving investments. This relatively easy path for local investments stands in stark contrast with the challenges of regional planning and the competitive bidding requirements that discourage utilities from being interested in making the large regional and inter-regional investments that are needed.

FERC could consider creating a new staff office for transmission oversight. Such an office would house transmission planning experts who can help the Commission ensure that investments are prudent and planning practices are sound.

CERTAIN INCENTIVES CAN HELP

Federal incentives could be extremely helpful to advance large-scale transmission that is in the national interest. Any dollar of federal support is one less dollar that needs to be the subject of contested cost allocation processes. A refundable investment tax credit for transmission, for example, could be very helpful.

In contrast to tax credits, incentives for transmission expansion in transmission rates from FERC should be discouraged, because those "incentives" are paid by customers and make cost allocation harder, not easier. Here we distinguish between rate incentives for grid expansion (as long as utilities can recover the costs with a reasonable return, no further incentives are needed) from rate incentives for operations. The latter help to counter-act the current disincentive to deploying such technologies and approaches.



RECOMMENDATIONS ON TRANSMISSION POLICY

1. Federal leadership should be provided on national transmission development at the Presidential, Secretarial, and FERC levels.
2. FERC should issue a comprehensive transmission planning rule to require forward-looking, pro-active, multi-benefit planning. It should consider multi-regional planning institutions as a way to develop reliable and efficient inter-regional plans.
3. FERC should continue and expand reliance on broad, beneficiary pays cost allocation, and ensure that grid planners consider all of the many benefits of transmission when allocating costs.
4. Congress should direct FERC to improve transmission planning, to clarify and strengthen its authority, and protect any FERC action from legal challenge.
5. Congress should consider federal funding of inter-regional connections and a macro grid. This support could take the form of tax credits, loans, and grants.
6. DOE should support large inter-regional planning analysis and stakeholder engagement.
7. FERC should require more and better use of benefit-cost analysis to ensure consumers benefit from transmission and to achieve the efficient scale of grid expansion.
8. DOE and FERC should utilize the federal permitting authorities that exist.
9. Merchant transmission should be encouraged where gaps exist in regulated transmission planning but should not be relied upon where it is possible to utilize a regulated planning and cost allocated approach.
10. FERC and state regulators should encourage deployment of Grid-Enhancing Technologies with incentives and as part of required open access transmission service.
11. FERC should exercise greater oversight over local transmission investments that may not benefit customers, to counter-act utility incentives to add to rate base. A new staff office for transmission planning and oversight could help perform this role and support transmission planning best practices.
12. Congress should pass an investment tax credit for large-scale regional and inter-regional transmission.
13. DOE should pursue R&D on HVDC converters, to bring down the costs of long-distance power delivery. Solid state power substation converters could bring down the cost of long-distance transmission and enable more pick-up and drop-off stations for HVDC lines.²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity, "Solid State Power Substation Technology Roadmap" and U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity, "Transformer Resilience and Advanced Components Program: Vision and Framework." U.S. Department of Energy, "Quadrennial Technology Review: An Assessment of Energy Technologies and Research Opportunities," 77.

CHAPTER 7:

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Reforming transmission and wholesale power markets is a very complicated exercise. Just as technologies are disrupting the sector, new approaches and innovations are being suggested and tried every day all around the world as power systems face very similar challenges. Post-mortem assessments of the recent Texas outages need to be performed and reviewed. We should not pretend to know all the answers at this time. The inquiry in this paper led to a number of recommendations summarized in the each chapter. These are not the end of the story. There are important questions for further analysis, including:

1. **What is a low-cost reliable generation portfolio for each region?** Detailed modeling is now possible to understand wind and solar output by location at every hour, which will help determine what other resources are needed including transmission, storage, and firm energy sources. Having a consensus view on each region's portfolio will also help determine product procurement and compensation. Such an evaluation should include a stress test for reliability that takes account of possible weather events in the future that may look different from the past, and interactions between the gas, power, water, and other critical infrastructure.
2. **Who should be responsible for resource adequacy and resource procurement generally in a way that fits with each state's preferences and institutions?** Generally this issue is up to individual states, yet most states have limited capacity to assess how the whole system fits together. How will this work in a split federal-state jurisdiction framework? States will need to assign responsibility as they choose, while FERC may need to act to ensure or certify that there is some accountable entity in each case that is able to support resource adequacy and procure power at all times needed.
3. **How will very large-scale transmission be financed and paid for?** Despite all of the recommendations for FERC and Congress, the nation does not have a regulatory structure in place for this need. Beginning in the New Deal era, rural areas were electrified and large amounts of remote renewable resources were developed and delivered to customers by federal agencies and what later became today's Power Marketing Administrations. Should the nation set up a new PMA for macro grid development? Should a regulator be given authority to compel its creation by regulated private transmission utilities? Should Congress fund a macro grid as an opportunity for promoting jobs, clean energy, and resilience? Perhaps we should face up to the full challenge rather than nibble around the edges of this problem.

4. **How exactly should each reliability service be defined in each region?** We provide a number of recommendations here. The system will evolve and new needs will arise. The exact product design, computing power considerations, incorporating advanced statistics and monitoring, and many other factors will influence how centralized spot markets will operate.
5. **How can power systems be operated not through direct control, but with prices, monitoring, estimation, and statistics?** Grid operators will need to develop tools to be assured of system balancing when they do not have their fingers on the buttons of all the resources.
6. **How do we operate power systems with less inertia? How much of this challenge can be solved with new technologies such as grid-forming inverters?** Inverter-based resource penetration along with the retirement of synchronous resources raises the possibility that at certain times the amount of inertia may be too low. Markets or regulations may be needed to address these situations, along with innovative operational practices.
7. **How do we make assessments of resource availability or scarcity?** DOE, RTOs, and/or other entities can help study whether power systems are running short on short-term reliability services, longer-term firm balancing resources, or other products.
8. **What level of computational resources will be necessary for grid operations and how should systems be designed?** Research into the architecture of system operations and market operations software is needed.




APPENDIX A:

THE NEW ECONOMICS OF CLEAN ENERGY

Wind, solar, and battery storage growth is driven by both an increase in consumer and policy-driven demand, and dramatic cost declines over the past decade. Through manufacturing at scale and technology advancement, solar PV has seen the largest drops in cost, falling over 90 percent over the last 10 years.²⁸¹ The cost of wind energy has fallen by over 70 percent over the same period, driven by manufacturing at scale and ever-increasing turbine size.²⁸² Battery storage saw a 61 percent decrease in total installed costs in just three years between 2015 and 2017, and costs continue to fall.²⁸³

These cost reductions create extremely favorable economics: new renewable energy development is not only competitive with new conventional sources, it is narrowly cost-competitive with existing fossil and nuclear generation. The chart in Figure 20 from Lazard's 2020 study of the Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) shows all-in costs of renewable energy on the left side with costs in the same range as marginal operating costs of conventional sources.²⁸⁴

FIGURE 20
COSTS OF NEW RENEWABLES VS. EXISTING CONVENTIONAL SOURCES



²⁸¹ Lazard, "Levelized Cost of Energy and Levelized Cost of Storage – 2020."

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Battery Storage in the United: An Update on Market," 18.

²⁸⁴ Lazard, "Levelized Cost of Energy and Levelized Cost of Storage – 2020."

Operating coal plants are either reaching the end of their design lives or struggling to recover their going-forward variable and operations and maintenance costs in competitive electricity markets.²⁸⁵ New coal plants, even with lower emissions of conventional pollutants, carry significant risk of expensive carbon regulations for investors. Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage holds some promise but as of yet appears cost-prohibitive and not yet proven. Petra Nova, the flagship carbon-capture retrofit on a Houston-area coal plant, was shut down after just over three years of operation due to poor economics.²⁸⁶

Natural gas commodity prices have fallen over the last decade and gas plant efficiencies have improved, making natural gas very competitive throughout the U.S. Hydraulic fracturing, both for oil and gas, has led to natural gas being more of a low-risk manufacturing process than an uncertain prospecting exercise, enabling lower cost financing of drilling operations.²⁸⁷ Natural gas has displaced a large amount of coal generation, which is responsible for a significant amount of carbon reductions.²⁸⁸ There is potential for carbon capture from natural gas plants. Going forward, gas is challenged by methane leakage in drilling and transportation, since methane is a potent greenhouse gas which reduces its overall greenhouse gas benefit, potentially significantly.²⁸⁹ And despite

a far more favorable permitting framework for pipelines relative to electric transmission, gas relies on pipeline construction which is being challenged by grassroots organizations and various regulatory agencies. Still, natural gas plants have been constructed in all regions of the U.S. and many utilities and IPPs are proposing more, by one estimate reaching \$100 billion for 235 new plants.²⁹⁰ The role of natural gas, whether it grows, or whether the plants merely stay online to provide power system balancing services, is a key question for utilities, states, and grid operators.

The trends above are similar all over the world, changing the global electricity resource mix.²⁹¹ Solar and wind turbines have similarly low costs and nuclear and coal plants have similarly high costs on all continents, with only moderate variation based on each country's resource base. Few countries have comparable cheap natural gas availability to the U.S. and Southeast Asia continues to build new coal generators,²⁹² while Europe proceeds even faster with renewable energy, becoming a leader in emerging technologies such as offshore wind.²⁹³ Development of renewables and storage around the world will likely contribute to the self-reinforcing cycle of cost reductions through deployment experience and economies of scale in manufacturing.

²⁸⁵ BloombergNEF and the Business Council for Sustainable Energy, "2020 Sustainable Energy in America Factbook," 21

²⁸⁶ Wamsted and Schlissel, "Petra Nova Mothballing-Mortem: Closure of Texas Capture Plant Is a Warning."

²⁸⁷ U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Trends in U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Upstream Costs."

²⁸⁸ Jackson et al., "The Environmental Costs and Benefits of Fracking."

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Gillis and O'Boyle, "Opinion | When Will Electricity Companies Finally Quit Natural Gas?"

²⁹¹ International Renewable Energy Agency, *Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2019*.

²⁹² Cornot-Gandolphe, "The Role of Coal in Southeast's Power Sector and Implications for Global and Regional Coal Trade."

²⁹³ International Energy Agency, "European Union 2020 – Energy Policy Review."

WIND AND SOLAR

Most wind, solar, and storage development is utility scale, with capacity measured in megawatts, since there are significant economies of scale for each technology. Wind energy scale is largely driven by the need to use larger turbines to reach better winds at higher hub heights, while PV and storage scales are driven by manufacturing and labor costs. Utility-scale solar is between one-third and one-tenth the cost of roof-top solar, in levelized-cost analysis.²⁹⁴

Still, distributed PV and storage are growing and will likely continue grow as the cost of both have fallen as well. Distributed energy resources are popular with many consumers and sometimes benefit from favorable retail rate designs many states want to provide. Rooftop PV is particularly popular, and there are many viable roofs that do not yet have solar. However, the approximately 18 GWs of capacity available on roofs is very small relative to energy demand so its role will be much smaller than utility scale PV.²⁹⁵

OFFSHORE WIND

Offshore wind costs have fallen dramatically in recent years. Between 2016 and 2018, the U.S. Department of Energy found the LCOE trend-line from a sample of global offshore wind studies to decrease from approximately \$150/MWh to \$120/MWh.²⁹⁶ By 2019, Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) estimated that global offshore wind

LCOE had fallen to an estimated \$78/MWh.²⁹⁷ Recent offshore wind PPAs in the U.S. have been signed at prices as low as \$65/MWh.²⁹⁸ The U.S. East Coast, particularly between Virginia and Massachusetts, is very conducive to offshore wind due to shallow waters and high wind speeds that reach over 10 meters/second.²⁹⁹ Offshore wind also can sell at higher value times than other wind and solar energy sources. California and Maine also offer deep-water options where floating turbines may be viable. These costs are in a range that enable coastal states that wish to secure local jobs and economic development to promote offshore wind without much incremental cost on their ratepayers, particularly where load is high, power prices are high, and opportunities for large-scale, land-based wind development is limited, as is the case in the Northeast and California.

BATTERY STORAGE

Lithium-ion batteries have quickly become a mainstream bulk power source, driven by cost reductions of 90 percent over the last decade.³⁰⁰ Batteries provide a wide set of electricity system services, including energy, capacity, load-shifting, transmission, and ancillary services. Lower costs from use of such batteries in consumer products from smart phones to electric vehicles contributes to continued manufacturing efficiencies that will likely bring down costs for bulk power system batteries. BNEF projects Lithium-ion battery costs falling in half by 2030.³⁰¹

²⁹⁴ Lazard, "Levelized Cost of Energy and Levelized Cost of Storage – 2020."

²⁹⁵ Solar Energy Industries Association, "Solar Industry Research Data."

²⁹⁶ Musial et al., "2018 Offshore Wind Technologies Market Report."

²⁹⁷ Morehouse, "Global Offshore Wind Prices Drop 32%."

²⁹⁸ Beiter et al., "The Vineyard Wind Purchase Agreement: Insights for Estimating Costs of U.S. Offshore Wind Projects."

²⁹⁹ Roberts, "Wind Resources of the United States."

³⁰⁰ Baker, "Electric Cars Closing In on Gas Guzzlers as Battery Costs Plunge - Bloomberg."

³⁰¹ Ibid.

DEMAND, DEMAND RESPONSE AND OTHER EMERGING RESOURCES

Significant changes to electricity demand have emerged in recent years. Electric vehicles are growing rapidly with cheaper batteries capable of powering longer-range vehicles, and growing consumer acceptance. Electric heat pumps for building and water heating are increasingly cost competitive, creating opportunities to heat buildings even in colder climates. These trends will likely significantly increase demand for electricity significantly.

In its medium electrification case, which projects buildings and transportation electrification using only technology price forecasts and other factors without incorporating public policy, the NREL projects that transportation electrification will create nearly terawatt-hours (TWh) of new demand in 2050, around a 25 percent increase from today's electricity demand, with building electrification more than making up for load reductions in the building sector caused by energy efficiency.³⁰²

Demand side resources are likely to become a much more active part of the electricity portfolio, and no longer function as a passive exogenous variable. When power system scarcity occurs, there are often customers willing to reduce their electricity consumption for a payment or a credit on their electricity bill that is lower cost than adding new generation capacity. Many specific uses of electricity can be shifted or reduced without harming customers' experience. For example, residential water heaters can be warmed up at different times and the water can stay hot for many

hours. Buildings and homes can be cooled at different times while keeping air temperatures comfortable. This *load flexibility* or *demand response* can itself be considered a supply source. A study in Australia not only found significant opportunities for commercial and industrial sites to deliver load flexibility with additional infrastructure, but that there are significant existing opportunities for demand response by shifting the usage of boilers and refrigerators. The study found that if markets open to demand participation and offer price-responsive tariffs, the economics will be favorable for businesses to participate.³⁰³ Similarly, analysis of the ERCOT market found that demand response of 1,500 MW to 3,100 MW helped meet peak loads of around 75,000 MW and that integrating more demand response would serve a critical role in meeting load as the resource mix evolves.³⁰⁴

In addition to the known and fairly predictable trends described above, there are likely to be certain unforeseen changes. Additional new technologies will likely enter to disrupt the power sector further. For example, there is a particular need for long duration storage technology given multi-day, seasonal and even annual variability in wind and solar output. Producing green hydrogen via electrolysis powered by excess wind and solar generation can be converted into a range of liquid, gaseous, and solid fuels that can be more easily stored and transported. Electrolysis costs could fall with standardization of plant design. Investors, companies, and governments are shifting significant resources to green hydrogen, with more than 70 GW of projects under development globally, costing \$250 billion by 2040.³⁰⁵

³⁰² Mai et al., "Electrification Futures Study: Scenarios of Electric Technology Adoption and Power Consumption for the United States," 60.

³⁰³ Institute for Sustainable Futures and Australian Alliance for Sustainable Energy and University of Technology, Sydney, "REALM for Industry."

³⁰⁴ Silverstein, "Resource Adequacy in Texas: Unleashing Demand-Side Resources in the ERCOT Market," 23.

³⁰⁵ Paul and Obayashi, "Explainer: Why Green Hydrogen Is Finally Getting Its Day in the Sun."



APPENDIX B:

PHYSICAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Elaborate systems of assigning physical capacity requirements and enforcing the requirements on various entities are different in almost every region of the U.S. This appendix serves to illustrate some of that nuance. The same physical and economic issues are at work in all power systems around the world, so we show some of the European approaches as well.

U.S. APPROACHES

The allocation of resource adequacy functions varies widely across the country. Generally, the function is performed by ISOs in PJM, NY, and New England, under FERC jurisdiction, and by the states elsewhere. But there are variations. FERC has approved a wide range of structures and has resisted requests from some stakeholders to standardize and impose approaches from one region onto another. There is no NERC standard requiring enforceable resource adequacy levels or a reserve margin, only to assess resource adequacy.³⁰⁶ The key functions include:

1. Determination of requirements. Typically, this is an Installed Reserve Margin (IRM) that is set region-wide based on a Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) analysis. The IRM tends to be in the range of 12-18 percent of generation capacity (MW) above peak load. Regions with more renewables are beginning to add flexibility (MW per minute change in output) requirements as well.
2. Enforcement of requirements on load. Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) are typically assigned a share of the regional IRM, subject to oversight and penalty.
3. Enforcement of requirements on generation. Generators or demand side resources that are counted towards an entity's capacity obligation are typically required to offer the capacity and deliver when needed ("must-offer" requirements), subject to penalties.
4. Operating a market. Supply and demand are stacked into central auctions, which some regions have and some do not. Some are voluntary residual auctions, some are mandatory for all load.
5. Determination of resource credit towards meeting requirement. Generators and load sources that are used to meet obligations are given credit typically based on their historical performance, such that forced outage rates, for example, reduce the capacity value a unit is able to sell. Capacity credit for storage and variable renewables is subject to debate currently, as well as capacity value for conventional generation that may be subject to "common mode failures." "Capacity value" (contribution to serving peak load) is not the same as "capacity factor" (annual average output as a percentage of maximum potential output).

³⁰⁶ NERC is only required to conduct "periodic assessments of the reliability and adequacy of the bulk-power system in North America," **Federal Power Act, 16 U.S. Code § 824o.**

Table 4 lists the roles for each of the seven U.S. ISO/RTOs. In many cases, there are overlapping roles for both states and the ISO/RTO. Local authorities oversee municipal and cooperative utilities. While there are often overlapping

roles, ultimately one entity is the final decision-maker. Table 4 lists the final decision-maker between government entities or the system operator (SO).

TABLE 4
ULTIMATE DECISION-MAKER FOR RESOURCE ADEQUACY FUNCTIONS
(System Operator (SO) under FERC jurisdiction vs state and local entities)

	MISO	CAISO	SPP	ERCOT	PJM	NYISO	ISO-NE
Set reqmt	State&local ³⁰⁷	SO and local ³⁰⁸	State&local	n/a ³⁰⁹	SO	State ³¹⁰	SO ³¹¹
Enforce on load	State&local	State & local ³¹²	State&local	n/a	SO	SO	SO
Enforce on gens	State and SO	SO ³¹³	State&local	n/a	SO	SO	SO
Central auction	Yes	none ³¹⁴	none ³¹⁵	none	Yes ³¹⁶	Yes ³¹⁷	Yes
Resource credit	State&local	State & local ³¹⁸	State&local	n/a	SO	SO	SO
Backstop procurem't	n/a	SO	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

³⁰⁷ While MISO sets an Installed Reserve Margin based on LOLE, it can be over-riden by a state and MISO will adopt it. MISO, "Business Practices Manual: Resource Adequacy," 24.

³⁰⁸ For non-CPUC regulated entities, CAISO accepts the IRM of local regulatory authorities. CAISO, "California Independent System Operator Corporation Fifth Replacement FERC Electric Tariff (Open Access Transmission Tariff)," 958-959.

³⁰⁹ Not applicable because ERCOT does not have a reserve margin requirement. ERCOT does set a target PRM of 13.75%, but it is not a requirement. ERCOT, "Report on the Capacity, Demand and Reserves (CDR) in the ERCOT Region, 2019-2028," 8.

³¹⁰ State of New York Public Service Commission, Order Adopting Installed Reserve Margin for the New York Control Area for the 2018-2019 Capability Year, CASE 07-E-0088, 6. NYISO, "Manual 4: Installed Capacity Manual."

³¹¹ NESCOE votes on the ISO-developed reserve margin. It is not clear what happens in the case of a conflict.

³¹² California Public Utilities Commission, "2019 Filing Guide for System, Local and Flexible Resource Adequacy (RA) Compliance Filings," 33

³¹³ Florio, "Sharing Power Among the Pacific States."

³¹⁴ Load Serving Entities (LSEs) can meet capacity requirements through self-supply or resources procured through bilateral contracts. Bushnell, Flagg, and Mansur, "Capacity Markets at a Crossroads," 25.

³¹⁵ Load Serving Entities (LSEs) can meet capacity requirements through self-supply or resources procured through bilateral contracts. Ibid.

³¹⁶ Limited exemption from PJM auction under Fixed Resource Requirement. See PJM, "Reliability Assurance Agreement."

³¹⁷ Bilateral transactions are allowed, see New York ISO, "Installed Capacity Manual," 157.


³¹⁸ The ISO defers to the CPUC and other LRAs to determine Qualifying Capacity (QC) values for all resources interconnected to the ISO system." See CAISO, "Resource Adequacy Enhancements."

EUROPEAN CAPACITY APPROACHES

Figure 21 illustrates the various approaches used in European electricity markets to address the same system physical and economic issues experienced in the U.S.³¹⁹ It shows the

wide variety of approaches and that the U.S. is not alone in struggling with an appropriate approach to resource adequacy for a high renewable energy future.

FIGURE 21
EUROPEAN CAPACITY APPROACHES



³¹⁹ European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, "ENTSO-E Proposed Methodologies, Common Rules and Terms of Reference to Cross-Border Participation in capacity Mechanisms."

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